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HEALTH CARE AND THE MYTH
OF SELF-RELIANCE
NICOLE HUBERFELD *
JESSICA L. ROBERTS **
Abstract: King v. Burwell asked the Supreme Court to decide if, in providing
assistance to purchase insurance “through an Exchange established by the
State,” Congress meant to subsidize policies bought on the federally run exchange. With its ruling, the Court saved the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act’s (“ACA”) low-income subsidy. But King is only part of a longer,
more complex story about health care access for the poor. In a move toward
universal coverage, two pillars of the ACA facilitate health insurance coverage
for low-income Americans, one private and one public: (1) the subsidy and
(2) Medicaid expansion. Although both have been subject to high-profile Supreme Court cases, the Court upheld one but gutted the other. This Article hypothesizes that the preference for private “hidden” government assistance over
public “visible” government assistance stems from the American myth of selfreliance. Yet this analysis reveals that the line between hidden and visible benefits breaks down on both theoretical and empirical levels. Drawing from vulnerability theory and demographic data, this Article demonstrates that all Americans lead subsidized lives and could move from the private to the public system.
It concludes that a single government program for the poor would be more economically and administratively efficient.
But there is another tradition that we share today. It calls upon us never
to be indifferent toward despair. It commands us never to turn away
from helplessness. It directs us never to ignore or to spurn those who
suffer untended in a land that is bursting with abundance.
—Lyndon B. Johnson 1
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Dependency is death to initiative, risk-taking and opportunity. Dependency is culture killing. It’s a drug. We’ve got to fight it like the poison it is.
—Mitt Romney 2

INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court decided King v. Burwell, one of the
Term’s most-watched cases. 3 In what was widely regarded as another attempt to dismantle the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),
the petitioners challenged the applicability of the statute’s low-income subsidy to health insurance policies purchased on the federally run exchange. 4
To allow low-income Americans to comply with the law’s individual insurance mandate, Congress included a tax credit to purchase subsidized coverage for individuals enrolled through an “Exchange established by the
State.” 5 Thirty-four states did not establish their own exchanges, though,
opting instead to have their residents rely on the insurance exchange run by
the federal government. 6 King therefore came down to simple statutory interpretation: did Congress intend the low-income subsidy to apply only to
the state exchanges? Although this issue might seem like lawyerly quibbling, experts estimated that the insurance coverage of up to thirteen million
Americans hung in the balance. 7 Ultimately, the Court decided in favor of
the government, rescuing a key feature of the ACA and preserving coverage
for millions of low-income Americans who purchased insurance through the
federal marketplace. 8 But the low-income subsidy is only part of the ACA’s
attempt to patch together health insurance coverage for all Americans.
1

Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., Remarks at the Signing of the Independence of the
Medicare Bill (July 30, 1965), in CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS HISTORY PROJECT : PRESIDENTS’ SPEECHES 18, 22 (n.d.), https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/
History/downloads/CMSPresidentsSpeeches.pdf [http://perma.cc/XV4G-Z4GJ].
2
Mitt Romney, Former Governor of Mass., Speech at the Conservative Political Action Conference (Feb. 7, 2008), in Associated Press, Mitt Romney Suspends Campaign, N.Y. T IM ES (Feb. 7,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/us/politics/08romney-transcript.html [https://perma.cc/
EH33-BURY].
3
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015); see James Taranto, Opinion, Unconstitutional After All?, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 27, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/unconstitutional-after-all-1425072324 (referring to King as one of the Term’s most-watched cases).
4
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487–88.
5
I.R.C. § 36B (2012); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (discussing tax credit goals of I.R.C. § 36B).
6
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487.
7
E.g., Drew Altman, How 13 Million Americans Could Lose Insurance Subsidies, WALL
STREET J.: WASH. WIRE (Nov. 19, 2014, 10:09 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/11/19/
how-13-million-americans-could-lose-insurance-subsidies [https://perma.cc/6CJP-C6EB].
8
See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (adopting reading of I.R.C. § 36B that allows the low-income
subsidy for those who purchased insurance through federal marketplace).
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Until recently, American health care was grounded in exclusion. 9 People who had health insurance could access needed health care and those
without health insurance often could not. The ACA reversed that norm, espousing a principle of inclusion or “universality” by facilitating universal
health insurance coverage. 10 Populations long excluded from coverage were
embraced by two pillars of the statute: the low-income subsidy that was
subject to the challenge in King and Medicaid expansion. Both have been
subject to high-profile Supreme Court cases. Although the low-income subsidy survived its legal challenge, expanding Medicaid has been a far more
contentious legal and political issue.
Congress designed the low-income subsidy and Medicaid to work together to provide health insurance to poorer Americans. Medicaid would catch
those individuals who could not afford health insurance but were previously
ineligible for the program, while tax subsidies would be available to people
earning too much for Medicaid to assist them with purchasing private health
insurance on newly created health insurance exchanges. 11 If the ACA were
being measured by lives covered, then this architecture appears to be successful so far, notwithstanding ongoing debate. As of March 20, 2015, the Medicaid expansion covered an estimated 11.2 million lives, 12 and the private insurance available through health insurance exchanges covered an estimated
eleven million lives, at least 86% of whom qualified for tax credit subsidies. 13
9

See generally Nicole Huberfeld, The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 67 (2015) (detailing the fragmented and exclusionary nature of health care in
the United States).
10
The authors have called this important statutory principle “universality” in several prior
works. See Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, An Empirical Perspective on Medicaid as
Social Insurance, 46 T OLEDO L. REV. 545, 546 (2015) [hereinafter Huberfeld & Roberts, Empirical]; Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Medicaid Expansion as Completion of the Great
Society, 1 ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPS. 1, 2 (2014), http://www.illinoislawreview.org/slip-opinions/
Huberfeld/ [https://perma.cc/7GA5-BMLD] [hereinafter Huberfeld & Roberts, Great Society]; see
also Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 68.
11
RACHEL GARFIELD & ANTHONY DAM ICO, KAISER FAM ILY FOUND., T HE COVERAGE GAP:
UNINSURED POOR ADULTS IN STATES T HAT DO NOT EXPAND MEDICAID—AN UPDATE 1 (2015),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-thatdo-not-expand-medicaid-an-update [https://perma.cc/E2N7-CZS5].
12
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM AN SERVS., MEDICAID ENROLLMENT AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (2015), http://aspe.
hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/139236/ib_MedicaidEnrollment.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K2J-AENG].
13
Matthew Buettgens et al., Marketplaces Make Significant Progress in 2015, URBAN INST .,
http://datatools.urban.org/features/marketplace-enrollment [https://perma.cc/8L7C-BJ2U] (last updated Apr. 8, 2015) (projecting eleven million enrollees at the end of 2015 open enrollment); Robert Pear, 86 Percent of Health Law Enrollees Receive Subsidies, White House Says, N.Y. T IM ES
(Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/us/11-7-million-americans-have-insuranceunder-health-act.html [https://perma.cc/7QJX-NBWP]. If the measure is premiums paid, a more
recent report indicates that about 10.2 million lives were covered as of the end of March 2015. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., March Effectuated Enrollment Consistent
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After the first round of enrollment under the ACA, approximately twenty million Americans gained health insurance that would have otherwise been unattainable, 14 and that number appears to be even larger after the second round
of enrollment. 15 According to a Gallup analysis, uninsured rates in the first
half of 2015 were the lowest they have been since 2008, at 11.4%, and the
National Health Interview Survey indicated the rate of uninsurance was 9%
of the population as of June 2015. 16
The Medicaid expansion, though, has generated ongoing friction and
negotiation within state political branches, as well as between the states and
the federal government. 17 When the Supreme Court left the decision to expand Medicaid to the states in the 2012 case National Federation of Indewith Department’s 2015 Goal: Nearly 8.7 Million People Nationwide Received an Average Tax
Credit of $272 per Month to Make Their Health Coverage More Affordable (June 2, 2015), http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2015pres/06/20150602a.html [https://perma.cc/5RB2-B2FE] (indicating
10.2 million persons had “paid for [m]arketplace coverage and still ha[d] an active policy” on
March 31, 2015).
14
David Blumenthal & Sara R. Collins, Health Care Coverage Under the Affordable Care
Act—A Progress Report, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 275, 280 (2014).
15
See id. at 277–78 (reporting eight million total enrollees through all marketplaces as of May
1, 2014); OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM AN SERVS., HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACES 2015 OPEN ENROLLM ENT
PERIOD: MARCH ENROLLM ENT REPORT 1 (2015), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
83656/ib_2015mar_enrollment.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT94-GB6Z] (reporting nearly 11.7 million
total enrollees through all marketplaces as of February 22, 2015).
16
MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ & ROBIN A. COHEN, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIM ATES FROM THE NATIONAL
HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, J ANUARY–J UNE 2015, at 1 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
nhis/earlyrelease/insur201511.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UFF-F3SF] (calculating uninsurance rates
based on a poll of 54,097 individuals); Stephanie Marken, U.S. Uninsured Rate at 11.4% in Second
Quarter, GALLUP (July 10, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/184064/uninsured-rate-secondquarter.aspx [https://perma.cc/98UF-Q8DX] (reporting uninsurance rates based on a poll of
44,000 people over three months in 2015). Both reports are reliable, but the Centers for Disease
Control (“CDC”) estimate probably is more accurate because it relies on extensive Census Bureau
data that are collected from all members of a household on a monthly basis rather than the single
data point collection by a phone call performed by Gallup. CDC also measures health insurance
coverage across three different time measures to account for the fluctuation in coverage that occurs regularly, especially among low-income populations. See MARTINEZ & COHEN, supra, at 9.
17
See, e.g., Josh Barro & Margot Sanger-Katz, Election Will Leave Medicaid Policies Largely Unchanged, N.Y. T IM ES: T HE UPSHOT (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/
upshot/election-results-2014-the-effect-on-medicaid-expansion.html [https://perma.cc/L7SC-ZCDY];
Jason Millman, The Election Might Keep Millions of People from Getting Health Insurance,
WASH. POST : WONKBLOG (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2014/11/05/the-election-might-keep-millions-of-people-from-getting-health-insurance [https://
perma.cc/C6PB-RFHP]; Sam Stein & Jeffrey Young, Medicaid Expansion for Millions Hinges on
Key Governors’ Races, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2014, 10:59 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2014/11/04/medicaid-expansion-governors_n_6097024.html
[https://perma.cc/LK83RPDB]; John Tozzi, Another Election Loser: Obamacare’s Medicaid Expansion, BUSINESSWEEK
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-11-05/another-midtern-election-loserobamacares-medicaid-expansion [https://perma.cc/4S3C-9JPP].
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pendent Business v. Sebelius (“NFIB”), 18 many state politicians denounced
expanding the program in an effort to solidify their political positions and to
distance themselves from both health care reform and President Obama. 19
Opponents of Medicaid expansion openly declared that providing health
care to the “able-bodied” poor could encourage dependency, leading to antagonism toward Medicaid expansion in particular. 20 In this rhetoric, politicians implicitly employ an ideal of self-reliance, a value long embedded in
the American political psyche. 21 According to this widely held belief, any
help from the government entails dependency, which conflicts with the ideals of freedom and self-sufficiency. 22 Because autonomy has been a central
value in American political culture, individuals who rely on state assistance
face stigma labeling them as “dependent and failures.” 23
Those who oppose Medicaid expansion have capitalized on this trope,
arguing that the program hurts, rather than helps, its beneficiaries and cre18

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
For a review of the reasons not to expand Medicaid cited by governors, see generally Benjamin D. Sommers & Arnold M. Epstein, U.S. Governors and the Medicaid Expansion—No Quick
Resolution in Sight, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 496 (2013). Not all Republican governors opposed
Medicaid expansion in their states. Id. at 497. Eight states with Republican leadership agreed to
the expansion. Id. For a deeper exploration of states’ decisions to expand Medicaid eligibility,
juxtaposed with their decisions regarding health insurance exchanges, see generally Tom Baker et
al., The New Health Care Federalism: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Federalism
Dynamics in Health Care and Beyond (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1434, Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 525, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2511003
[https://perma.cc/Y4YL-RN4S].
20
See, e.g., Gray Rohrer, House Kills Senate’s Health Care Expansion, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(June 5, 2015, 8:23 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/politics/os-special-session-dayfive-20150605-story.html [https://perma.cc/KBT5-JKZK] (“Opponents objected to the [Medicaid]
bill because it relied too much on federal funds and would expand coverage to what they called
‘single, able-bodied adults.’”).
21
See, e.g., HENRY DAVID T HOREAU, Resistance to Civil Government, in WALDEN AND RESISTANCE TO CIVIL GOVERNM ENT 226 (William Rossi ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2d ed. 1992)
(1849). This essay produced such well-known thoughts as: “That government is best which governs not at all,” id., “For government is an expedient by which men would fain succeed in letting
one another alone; and, as has been said, when it is most expedient, the governed are most let
alone by it,” id. at 227, “The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited
monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect for the individual. . . . There will
never be a really free and enlightened State, until the State comes to recognize the individual as a
higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats
him accordingly,” id. at 245. Some perceive this not as anti-government but anti- “unjust” government. See, e.g., AARON BARLOW, T HE CULT OF INDIVIDUALISM 138–39 (2013) (discussing
Thoreau’s essay as a contemplation of the role of government in supporting the individual).
22
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EM ORY
L.J. 251, 258–59, 258 n.26 (2011) (“The importance of the idea of independence to the construction of an autonomous and equal individual may be traced to the fact that the very existence of the
United States begins with a document entitled ‘The Declaration of Independence.’”).
23
Id. at 259.
19
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ates a socially undesirable state of dependency. 24 In states that have already
expanded Medicaid, politicians have sought ways to link Medicaid to work
requirements, 25 even though Medicaid was delinked from welfare in 1996
and two-thirds of the people who qualify for expansion have at least one
worker in the household. 26 In their rhetoric and proposed policies, politicians have therefore mirrored many either-or dichotomies associated with
the American myth of self-reliance, such as construing individuals as either
workers or paupers who either work or receive benefits, respectively.
Exclusionary policymaking is nothing new, 27 but undermining the
ACA’s attempt at universal coverage has substantial consequences beyond
grandiloquence. The reluctance of some states to expand Medicaid has led
24
See Sommers & Epstein, supra note 19, at 498 (“For instance, Dennis Daugaard (R-SD) declared that ‘able-bodied adults should be self-reliant’—in contrast to children or people with disabilities, the traditional Medicaid beneficiaries.”); see also Tara Culp-Ressler, Scott Walker: Denying
Health Care to Low-Income People Helps Them ‘Live the American Dream,’ T HINKPROGRESS (Nov.
14, 2014, 11:18 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/11/14/3592511/scott-walker-medicaidexpansion [https://perma.cc/L5JR-KFPX] (“Wisconsin Gov[ernor] Scott Walker (R) on Friday
suggested that denying health coverage to additional low-income Americans helps more people
‘live the American Dream’ because they won’t be ‘dependent on the American government.’”);
Brendan Kirby, Governor Bentley Offers Unapologetic Defense of Decision to Reject Medicaid
Expansion, AL. COM : BLOG (Jan. 14, 2014, 8:35 PM), http://blog.al.com/wire/2014/01/governor_
bentley_offers_unapol.html [https://perma.cc/E6P6-QTW7] (quoting Governor Robert Bentley of
Alabama as saying “[a]nd under Obamacare, Medicaid would grow even larger—bringing millions more people to a state of dependency on government”).
25
The first state to seek a Medicaid-work linkage in its expansion waiver was Pennsylvania.
Associated Press, Pennsylvania Awaits Ruling on Proposal to Link Work Requirements to Medicaid Benefits, PBS NEWS HOUR (Apr. 27, 2014, 1:06 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
rundown/pennsylvania-awaits-ruling-proposal-link-work-requirements-medicaid-benefits [https://
perma.cc/W28R-DGXA]. Even though the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) rejected the linkage between work and Medicaid, other states have continued to push it;
for example, Missouri’s Governor touted work requirements while considering expansion. Jordan
Shapiro, Missouri Gov. Endorses Work Requirement as Part of Medicaid Expansion Plan, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 12, 2015), http://khn.org/news/missouri-gov-endorses-work-requirement-aspart-of-medicaid-expansion-plan [https://perma.cc/MKC4-8MBH]; see also Letter from Marilyn
Tavenner, Office of the Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Beverly Mackereth,
Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare 2 (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIPProgram-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/pa/pa-healthy-ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R6P7-VWPJ] (approving a demonstration waiver but not work requirements related to Medicaid
expansion). Most recently, Montana expanded its Medicaid program through a § 1115 waiver, and
it included job training (but not work requirements per se) in the rules for newly eligible enrollees.
Sanjay Talwani, Montana Medicaid Expansion Earns Key Federal Approval, KRTV. COM (Nov.
2, 2015, 7:44 PM), http://www.krtv.com/story/30414878/montana-medicaid-expansion-earns-keyfederal-approval [https://perma.cc/5FVL-MKPB].
26
KAISER COM M ’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAM ILY FOUND., KEY
FACTS ABOUT THE UNINSURED POPULATION 5 fig.4 (2014), http://files.kff.org/attachment/keyfacts-about-the-uninsured-population-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/LRU4-95BR] [hereinafter KEY
FACTS ABOUT THE UNINSURED] (noting that in 2013, 71% of nonelderly uninsured households
had one or more full-time workers).
27
See generally Huberfeld, supra note 9 (discussing exclusionary practices in health care).
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to an insurance coverage gap for individuals who make too much to be eligible for a non-expanded Medicaid program yet not enough to qualify for
the ACA’s premium assistance tax subsidies—what one of the authors has
dubbed the problem of the penultimate poor. 28 As a result of states’ opting
out of the expansion, more than six million people are not eligible for Medicaid. 29
In contrast, hidden government assistance—which is to say, subsidies
funneled through the tax system—invites far less of what this Article will
call “self-reliance scrutiny” than visible public assistance. Tax-free employer-provided benefits are rarely discussed as a government subsidy for purchasing health insurance. 30 Likewise, the ACA’s low-income subsidy has
garnered far less criticism than Medicaid expansion. In fact, Congress designed the ACA to push most people into private insurance—even when
that insurance is highly subsidized by the government—because it seems
more politically desirable. 31 Yet despite their perceived differences, Medicaid and the low-income subsidy are substantially similar in nature. They
are both government programs designed to secure health insurance for lowto-middle income individuals with minimal cost-sharing for those who are
too poor to buy into the system.
Despite the vitriol directed at Medicaid and the relative acceptance of
the low-income subsidy, both government programs serve largely the same
populations. This Article argues that Medicaid expansion and the low-income
subsidy are effectively the same: they have similar goals and operate in sim28
See Garfield & Damico, supra note 11 (discussing the coverage gap); Nicole Huberfeld, Penultimate Poor and the Individual Mandate, HEALTHLAWPROF BLOG (Jan. 31, 2013), http://law
professors.typepad.com/healthlawprof_blog/2013/01/penultimate-poor-and-the-individual-mandate.
html [https://perma.cc/LY3A-HYB4].
29
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIM ATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREM E COURT DECISION 3 (2012),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.
pdf [https://perma.cc/HF3U-2DEG].
30
See Joseph Antos, Opinion, End the Exemption for Employer-Provided Health Care, N.Y.
T IM ES (Apr. 14, 2015, 6:45 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/14/the-worsttax-breaks/end-the-exemption-for-employer-provided-health-care [https://perma.cc/P5QL-DP3L].
As one scholar explained,

The largest tax break in the federal tax code is a stealth subsidy that is both unfair
and inefficient. Premiums paid for employer-sponsored health insurance are excluded from taxable income, reducing the amount workers owe in income and payroll
taxes by about $250 billion annually. In effect, the exclusion is the third largest
health program after Medicare and Medicaid, yet it has been largely ignored as
Congress has tried to rein in federal health spending.
Id.
31
PAUL STARR, REM EDY AND REACTION 20–21, 194 (rev. ed. 2013) (describing the choice
to build health care reform on private insurance coverage).
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ilar ways. First, this Article disputes, on a theoretical level, the American
myth of self-reliance and the perceived divide between good citizens with
private insurance and socially undesirable dependents with public benefits.
Vulnerability theory challenges the notion that human beings are autonomous, independent actors, instead arguing that we are all susceptible to illness, injury, and disability. 32 Viewed through this lens, the Medicaid expansion and the low-income subsidy are examples of the state responding to the
same universal needs of its citizens. Next, this Article challenges the dividing line between visible and hidden government assistance on a practical
level. Research indicates that, under the current system, the same individuals bounce back and forth between the public and private systems. In fact,
the difference between being labeled a socially undesirable dependent who
must rely on Medicaid and a good working citizen who purchases private—
albeit highly subsidized—coverage can be as little as a few days of pay per
year. Hence, this Article asserts that no principled, meaningful difference
exists between government assistance in health insurance via a visible benefit, like Medicaid, and government assistance in health insurance via a hidden benefit, like the low-income subsidy.
Having demonstrated that the line between hidden and visible benefits
is both theoretically and empirically unsound, this Article contemplates a
unified government program for providing health insurance for low-income
Americans. Not only would a single system break down some of the stigma
associated with dependency, it would also be more financially and administratively efficient, as individuals would no longer need to cycle between
public and private benefits. Importantly, this Article does not answer the
question of whether Medicaid and the low-income subsidies create economic dependence or facilitate economic independence. That question is better
left to social scientists and economists. 33 Instead, this Article simply argues
that a single benefits system for low-income individuals—whether Medicaid-based or subsidy-based—would have meaningful social and practical
benefits.
32
See infra notes 188–269 and accompanying text (examining vulnerability theory and what
it can teach about the flawed dichotomy between dependence and self-reliance).
33
Research finds that social insurance programs facilitate financial independence for beneficiaries as well as tax benefits for government. See generally, e.g., David W. Brown et al., Medicaid as an Investment in Children: What Is the Long-Term Impact on Tax Receipts? (Nat’l Bureau
for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20,835, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20835.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2XMR-N2EB] (discussing Medicaid’s significant long term economic benefits
for beneficiaries and for the government); Laura R. Wherry et al., Childhood Medicaid Coverage
and Later Life Health Care Utilization (Nat’l Bureau for Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
20,929, 2015), http://harris.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/WherryMillerKaestnerMeyer_9-252015.pdf [https://perma.cc/84XY-4T4Y] (finding that extended coverage for children under Medicaid’s 1983 amendments correlated with lower medical utilization as adults).
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This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I considers the history of exclusion in American health care that led to our divided system of government
assistance, made up of highly visible direct funding and hidden tax subsidies. 34 This Part asserts that despite their substantive similarities, one has
been stigmatized while the other has not. Part II outlines the American myth
of self-reliance and its associated assumptions and dichotomies, demonstrating how the division between visible and hidden government benefits for
health insurance parallels those dyads. 35 Part II goes on to debunk the myth of
self-reliance, both theoretically and empirically, arguing that the dividing line
explored in Part I is unprincipled at best and harmful at worst. Finally, Part III
concludes that it would be more efficient both economically and administratively for individuals to be covered by one program, contrary to the current
structure of the law, which facilitates needless bouncing between two unconnected and complex systems for people in already fragile circumstances. 36
Part III considers possibilities for unified coverage, exploring the benefits and
drawbacks of either an all-subsidy program or an all-Medicaid program in
light of the principle of universality.
I. DIVIDED GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE IN HEALTH CARE
This Part presents the origins of our divided system of visible and hidden government assistance in health insurance. Despite the substantial similarities between these two kinds of government aid, one is highly stigmatized while the other is socially and politically accepted. The dividing line
between visible public health insurance and hidden subsidies in private
health insurance has facilitated a story of self-reliance for people who are in
the private market, and that dividing line remains powerful even in the new
era of universality in health insurance access and coverage. This Part will
explore the visible and hidden supports for health insurance access and the
narratives regarding self-reliance that they have encouraged over time.
A. Visible Government Assistance
Direct federal funding is the most familiar form of government assistance because it is the most visible. The federal government has created various medical safety net programs since the New Deal, and today every
34
See infra notes 37–104 and accompanying text (examining the historical development of
the current bifurcated government assistance systems).
35
See infra notes 105–270 and accompanying text (exploring current government supports for
health insurance in light of the self-reliance myth and vulnerability theory).
36
See infra notes 271–320 and accompanying text (advocating a move to one healthcaresupport system and exploring possibilities therefor).
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American has a family member, friend, or coworker who benefits from
them, particularly Medicare and Medicaid. Although Medicare, Medicaid,
and other more minor federal health care programs are not cohesive as a
cohort of federal statutes, 37 they still manage to cover a significant portion
of the American population’s health care needs. Combined, Medicare and
Medicaid cover 37% of the nation’s total population, 43% of the insured
population, 38 and represent approximately 35% of national health expenditures. 39 Medicaid now covers more insureds than Medicare, at nearly 71
million lives and 16% of national health expenditures, 40 whereas Medicare
covers 55 million lives (46.3 million elderly and 9 million people with disabilities) and accounts for approximately 22% of national health expenditures. 41 Each program is worth considering in its own right and in comparison to the other.
Medicare is a national social insurance program that covers people
aged sixty-five and over and those who are permanently disabled, regardless of their wealth, state of residence, or other status. 42 Impoverishment of
the elderly was commonplace by the 1950s; by attacking the risk represented by that basic, economic measure from its passage in 1965 until today,
Medicare has been demonstrably successful in lifting most of our elderly
population out of poverty caused by medical expenses. 43 Despite being the
closest thing Americans have to the oft-vilified “socialized medicine,” Med37

See Abbe R. Gluck, Symposium Issue Introduction: The Law of Medicare and Medicaid at
Fifty, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 16 (2015) (suggesting that Congress’s committee
structure may be responsible for this lack of coherence).
38
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM AN SERVS.,
FISCAL YEAR 2014 J USTIFICATION OF ESTIM ATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COM M ITTEES 2, http://
www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/PerformanceBudget/Downloads/FY2014-CJ-Final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/XU2P-N2VP] (stating Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance
Program cover 116 million beneficiaries).
39
See NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
NHE-Fact-Sheet.html [https://perma.cc/TL34-RTG8] (last updated July 28, 2015). National
Health Expenditure data indicate that as of 2013, Medicare paid 20% of national health expenditures and Medicaid paid 15%, but that includes the states’ contribution to Medicaid funding. Id.
40
J ULIA PARADISE, KAISER FAM ILY FOUND., MEDICAID MOVING FORWARD 1 (2015),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-medicaid-moving-forward [https://perma.cc/62KD-SYTL].
41
J ULIETTE CUBANSKI ET AL., KAISER FAM ILY FOUND., A PRIM ER ON MEDICARE 1 (2015),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/report-a-primer-on-medicare-key-facts-about-the-medicare-programand-the-people-it-covers [https://perma.cc/59AS-8HP4] (number of lives covered); id. at 30 fig.26
(percentage of national health expenditures).
42
42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2012) (establishing eligibility criteria for Medicare’s hospital and hospice care provisions).
43
Ezekiel Emanuel, Symposium Keynote Speech, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 27,
30 (2015) (“[I]n 1964, just about 30% of the elderly were living in poverty . . . , even with Social
Security . . . . [W]ith the combination of Medicare and the increases in Social Security, . . . 9% of
the elderly are in poverty. It is the lowest demographic in the United States in poverty.”).
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icare is also politically popular. 44 In fact, Congress intentionally removed
medical care for the elderly from welfare-based state control due to effective lobbying by the elderly, who argued that they should not be subject to
the whims of states’ welfare-oriented programming, which was often financially inconsistent and sometimes punitive in attitude. 45 Medicare thus created a national, universal approach to insuring the elderly by recognizing
the commonly shared risk related to vulnerability in old age and creating a
program that would respond at a low cost to beneficiaries’ medical needs.
Medicare’s universal approach does not allow for stigma. In part, this
may result from the fact that people must have paid work-related taxes for
forty quarters in order to automatically qualify for Medicare Part A at age
sixty-five. 46 For all of its universalism, Medicare is still a work-related program. 47 But it also draws on the public’s understanding and hope that all of us
will become elderly, and none of us want to be impoverished when that day
comes. Medicare draws on a principle of solidarity, the polar opposite of
stigma, in addition to universality. In its inclusive approach to medical care,
Medicare could be viewed as an exceptional program in America’s pantheon of health care legislation and policy, which typically has drawn on the
American ideal of self-reliance to create limited, non-universal benefits,
discussed in the context of Medicaid below.
In contrast, Congress designed Medicaid to facilitate health care access
for specific groups deemed worthy of public assistance. 48 Medicaid was
enacted with the same pen stroke as Medicare, but the two programs are
structurally and politically dissimilar. Medicare is administered and funded
entirely by the federal government (with the help of regional private contractors), and it is structured as federal spending subject to federal policy. In
44
The American Medical Association (“AMA”) and free-market-oriented politicians always
have challenged health care reform that would cover more of the population with government
assistance by issuing the rallying cry of “socialized medicine.” See, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS &
ROSEM ARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AM ERICA 52 (1974) (describing fear that Medicaid
would establish “socialized medicine”); Am. Med. Ass’n, Ronald Reagan Speaks Out Against
Socialized Medicine, YOUTUBE (Aug. 1, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRdLpemAAs (initially distributed by AMA in 1961 to rally opposition to Medicare by decrying socialized
medicine). See generally STARR, supra note 31 (recounting the AMA’s fight against health care
reform through the twentieth century and up to the passage of the ACA).
45
See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 44, at 45–47 (describing various predecessors and
contemporary counterproposals to Medicare).
46
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (granting Medicare eligibility to, among others, those age sixty-five
or over who are eligible for Social Security).
47
Those who do not meet the forty-quarter minimum can purchase Part A coverage upon
turning sixty-five, but the point remains the same—America’s social insurance is still a program
for those who have played by the rule of self-sufficiency by working.
48
See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST . L. 431, 432 (2011) (describing Medicaid as “the caboose to Medicare’s train”).
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contrast, Medicaid has been considered a quintessential cooperative federalism program, a joint state-federal endeavor, underwritten and designed by
the federal government but administered by each state with some state funding as well as state options to expand the program beyond the federal minimum requirements. 49
Medicaid differs dramatically from Medicare not only from governance and funding perspectives but also in the principles the program historically embodied. When Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965, the program
covered only the “deserving poor,” meaning the elderly, disabled, pregnant
women, and children. 50 The original Medicaid eligibility rules reflected the
Elizabethan notion that only those blameless for their circumstances were
worthy of aid. 51 The deserving poor were not deemed to be culpable for
their inability to care for themselves and, consequently, were “deserving” of
government assistance. 52 Not surprisingly, Medicaid did not render eligible
childless, non-disabled, working-age adults. 53
The idea that social policies should discourage dependence is nothing
new; self-reliance is a long-standing American ideal, as discussed at greater
length in Part II. 54 The narrative of dependence as culturally undesirable is
so strong, though, that at the same time “deserving” status rendered Medicaid enrollees worthy of redistributive federal assistance, it imposed stigma
even beyond that typically attributable to poverty.
Further, states’ fiscal policies have facilitated the prejudice Medicaid
enrollees have faced. Historic efforts to address poverty through responsive
governmental support show that states consistently have underfunded programs designed to assist the poor. 55 In the case of Medicaid, this has meant

49

42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a–1396f (2012) (establishing a federalist structure in part through funding from Comptroller General of the United States and review of state policies).
50
STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 44, at 8, 24, 51–53 (discussing the formation of Medicaid).
51
Huberfeld, supra note 48, at 439–40 (describing the evolution of the concept of the “deserving poor”).
52
Id. at 439 (stating that “[c]ertain categories of blameless or ‘deserving’ poor have been
assisted by local, state, or federal government since the turn of the twentieth century”).
53
See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 44, at 57 (describing those eligible for Medicaid as
“families with dependent children and . . . aged, blind or permanently disabled individuals [unable
to afford medical care]”).
54
See infra notes 105–187 and accompanying text (examining self-reliance as an enduring
American mythological ideal).
55
See generally Theda Skocpol, Targeting Within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to
Combat Poverty in the United States, in T HE URBAN UNDERCLASS 411 (Christopher Jencks &
Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (discussing how many major government efforts to combat poverty
have faltered).
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low funding that leads to below-norm payment rates for providers. 56 Low
reimbursement rates have a signaling effect, hinting that states view these
patients as not warranting health care providers’ full efforts. Low payment
in Medicaid is, like other welfare programs, a remnant of the Elizabethan
fear of prolonged dependence and permanent pauperism. It also reflected
fear southern states expressed in the passage of the Social Security Act and
subsequent related programs that poor African-Americans would rely on
states for support and that the federal money supporting them would expedite desegregation. 57 For these and other reasons, welfare programs have
long been underfunded in the United States, and that underfunding has contributed to Medicaid’s stigma. 58
Fast forward to the ACA, in which Congress created a universal insurance coverage architecture that expanded Medicaid eligibility and promised
states generous funding for the newly eligible population’s entry into Medicaid. 59 More specifically, the ACA mandated expansion of Medicaid eligibility to all adults under age sixty-five with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level (“FPL”). 60 For the first time, the expansion includes nondisabled, non-elderly, childless adults in Medicaid. The federal government
56
Nicole Huberfeld, The Supreme Court Ruling That Blocked Providers from Seeking Higher
Medicaid Payments Also Undercut the Entire Program, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1156, 1157 (2015) (discussing Medicaid’s historic low payment and its potential effect on the success of expansion).
57
EDWIN E. WITTE, T HE DEVELOPM ENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 143–44 (1962).
Witte wrote:

Title I of the original bill was very bitterly attacked, particularly by Senator Byrd, on
the score that it vested in a federal department the power to dictate to the states to
whom pensions should be paid and how much. In this position, Senator Byrd was
supported by nearly all of the southern members of both committees, it being very
evident that at least some southern senators feared that this measure might serve as
an entering wedge for federal interference with the handling of the Negro question
in the South. The southern members did not want to give authority to anyone in
Washington to deny aid to any state because it discriminated against Negroes in the
administration of old age assistance.
Id.
58
See generally DAVID G. SM ITH & J UDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND POLICY
1965–2007 (2008) (highlighting historical biases, legislation, and policies that contribute to Medicaid’s stigma, as expressed in underfunding and other programmatic weaknesses).
59
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. tits. 18, 20–21, 25–26, 28–31, 35, 42 (2012)).
Congress amended the ACA immediately by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010 (“HCERA”), Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.
tits. 20, 26, 42 (2012)). This Article refers to the two Acts collectively as the ACA.
60
ACA § 2001, 124 Stat. at 271. As modified by the HCERA, the Medicaid expansion includes individuals earning up to 138% of the FPL due to a 5% income disregard. HCERA
§ 1004(e), 124 Stat. at 1036. This Article accounts for this adjustment by referring to the expansion level as 138% of the FPL.
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completely funds the expansion through 2017, gradually decreasing the federal match to 90% by 2020 (the “supermatch”). Even when reduced in
2020, the supermatch is greater than the Medicaid funding states have received historically, which is tied to per capita income and ranges from no
less than 50% to approximately 78% federal funding on the state dollar.
Nearly one in four Americans will have medical care and costs covered
by the Medicaid program when it has been fully expanded pursuant to the
ACA. 61 The Medicaid expansion responded to America’s high levels of uninsurance (more than one-fifth of the population when the ACA was passed)
as well as the fact that most of the uninsured were low-income working
poor who either were not offered health insurance as an employment benefit
or were offered health insurance that is unaffordable. As with past Medicaid
amendments, this expansion responded to state inability (or unwillingness)
to cover low-income citizens who needed consistent access to health care.
The promise of full federal funding for the newly eligible population
enticed some states to expand their Medicaid programs; however, half of the
states challenged the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion, resulting
in the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB. 62 That judgment gave states the
power to ignore the ACA’s mandated Medicaid expansion without other
penalties, effectively rendering the Medicaid expansion optional by limiting
the Federal Department of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) ability to
enforce its own statute. To date, thirty states and the District of Columbia
have decided to participate in expansion. The remaining states are more slowly negotiating their expansions internally and through the waiver process
with HHS.
The ACA rejected Medicaid’s exclusionary approach to health care
coverage, but NFIB-empowered states are resisting the principle of universality in their discussions with HHS. 63 State politicians have displayed reticence to opt into Medicaid expansion based on bias against those historically deemed unworthy of governmental assistance, mainly the “able-bodied”
poor. Some examples of this bias have included: “It was never designed to

61

See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, T HE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2014 TO 2024, at 58
(2014), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45010-Outlook2014_Feb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R4PZ-35EK] (projecting enrollment of eighty-nine million individuals in Medicaid by 2024).
62
132 S. Ct. at 2580, 2581, 2606–07. Twenty-six states challenged the Affordable Care Act.
Id. at 2580. These challengers specifically questioned the Medicaid expansion. Id. at 2581. Eventually the Court’s decision severely limited the power of the Medicaid expansion. See id. at 2606–
07.
63
Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 85.
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be there for able-bodied adults.” 64 “[Medicaid] creates a new welfare entitlement system for able-bodied working adults.” 65 “I’d rather find a way,
particularly for able-bodied adults without children, . . . to get them into the
workforce.” 66 And, most recently, regarding failed legislation in Florida,
“Opponents objected to the bill because it relied too much on federal funds
and would expand coverage to what they called ‘single, able-bodied
adults.’” 67
Additionally, state politicians have expressed concern that Medicaid
expansion will lead to “dependency” (ostensibly rather than working). Politicians have stated, for example: “We can break the cycle of poverty, but not
with programs that drag our communities and our people into the downward
spiral of dependence,” 68 and, “Imagine what we could do if we took a good
chunk of that money and put it toward job training.” 69 Part II demonstrates
that this perception of low-income Americans who need health insurance as
non-workers is measurably false, but these statements still matter. Although
on the surface they appear to be political theater in the name of American
individualism, 70 this viewpoint is being incorporated into Republican proposals for variations on the Medicaid expansion. Some red states have tried
to include work requirements in their expansion negotiations and plans.
HHS cannot approve the incorporation of work requirements into a § 1115
waiver for Medicaid expansion because it is unrelated to the Medicaid Act’s
64

Greg Richter, Bobby Jindal: Medicaid Expansion Robs People of Private Insurance,
NEWSM AX (Nov. 16, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/bobby-jindalmedicaid-insurance-private/2014/11/16/id/607634 [https://perma.cc/5UPG-QJCF] (reporting remarks of Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana on “Meet the Press”).
65
Laura Vozzella, Va. House GOP Budget Plan to Include Health Funds for Mentally Ill,
Poor, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/vahouse-gop-budget-plan-to-include-health-funds-for-mentally-ill-poor/2015/02/05/84d14a0a-ad6211e4-9c91-e9d2f9fde644_story.html [https://perma.cc/MW76-43EQ] (quoting remarks of Steve
Landes, Vice Chairman of Appropriations Committee of Virginia House of Delegates).
66
Sarah Ferris, Gov. Walker Faces Growing Pressure Over Medicaid Expansion, T HE HILL
(Feb. 17, 2015, 12:54 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/232962-new-medicaid-cost-estimatesadd-pressure-to-scott-walker [https://perma.cc/NK2D-LFXH] (reporting remarks by Governor Scott
Walker of Wisconsin).
67
Rohrer, supra note 20 (quoting multiple legislative opponents of a bill that would have
accepted the Medicaid expansion).
68
Robert Bentley, Governor of Ala., State of the State Address (Jan. 14, 2014), http://
governor.alabama.gov/newsroom/2014/01/governor-bentleys-2014-state-state-address [https://perma.
cc/346P-DN34].
69
Medicaid Redesign Proposal Stalls, UNICAM ERAL UPDATE (Apr. 9, 2015), http://update.
legislature.ne.gov/?p=17048 [https://perma.cc/KY5W-K6HG] (quoting State Senator Beau McCoy
in the Nebraska legislative session).
70
See David W. Johnson & Nancy M. Kane, The U.S. Healthcare System: A Product of
American History and Values, in T HE FRAGM ENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 323 (Einer R.
Elhauge ed., 2010) (discussing the role of American individualism in the health care system as a
whole).
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provision of “medical assistance,” yet some states are still considering their
own side-along work requirements for the newly eligible Medicaid population. 71
Even though Medicaid was decoupled from welfare in 1996, the expansion’s universality is being distorted into a return to castigatory welfarestyle requirements. The work and dependency rhetoric draw heavily on the
myth of self-reliance, as discussed in Part II. Although the ACA rejected the
notion that only some individuals are worthy of assistance in its universalism, states are reintroducing that narrative thanks to NFIB. 72 This trend
stands in sharp contrast to the indirectly funded, employer-based, private
health insurance system, discussed next in section B.
B. Hidden Government Assistance
Unlike the disdain for the visible assistance described above, private
insurance coverage has carried an air of belonging and acceptance; people
with private health insurance most often obtain it through their employers,
an arrangement encouraged through longstanding federal tax subsidies to
both employers and employees. In many ways, private insurance connotes
playing by the rules, while public insurance (except for Medicare) connotes
shirking.
Although programs like Medicare and Medicaid appear to be paradigmatic government-assisted health insurance, federal tax policy has enabled
broad access to health insurance coverage for decades, and for a large portion of the population, albeit indirectly through employer-based health insurance benefits. The hidden nature of tax benefits, in addition to the narrative that people who purchase private insurance are self-reliant, has rendered this form of subsidy for private health insurance less politically
charged.
But the economic reality of tax subsidization of private health insurance is masked. In part, this indirect source of federal assistance is hidden
because the annual federal accounting of “National Health Expenditures”
71

See Drew Altman, Behind the Split Over Linking Medicaid Coverage to Work Requirements, WALL STREET J.: WASH. WIRE (May 11, 2015, 9:55 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/
2015/05/11/behind-the-split-over-linking-medicaid-coverage-to-work-requirements [https://perma.
cc/PUF4-7JQ7] (discussing various states’ proposals or work requirements for the newly eligible
Medicaid expansion population).
72
KAISER COM M ’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAM ILY FOUND., ARE UNINSURED ADULTS WHO COULD GAIN MEDICAID COVERAGE WORKING? 1–2 (2015), http://files.
kff.org/attachment/fact-sheet-are-uninsured-adults-who-could-gain-medicaid-coverage-working
[https://perma.cc/S8T4-VFQG] [hereinafter UNINSURED ADULTS] (discussing the red state drive
for work requirements in implementing Medicaid eligibility expansion under the ACA and the
demographics of the uninsured population relative to work status).
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published by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services does not include tax incentives in its tally. 73 Instead, the report examines household, federal government, state and local government, and private business spending
on health care. 74 Additionally, most private health insurance is obtained as
an employment benefit, and employees notoriously do not notice how much
they and their employer contribute to their private insurance, let alone how
much the federal government subsidizes that insurance through tax breaks. 75
In a 2002 Harvard study, researchers determined that the federal government accounts for nearly sixty percent of health spending when tax incentives are counted in federal government spending, rather than just “who
wrote the last check.” 76 Thus, this Article calls private insurance subsidies—whether they pre-date or post-date the ACA—“hidden government
assistance.” This section considers, briefly, the history and nature of hidden
government assistance for private health insurance as well as the ACA’s
reliance on this preexisting system of subsidies.
Since the early 1900s, cash-payment medical care has been too expensive for low- and middle-income Americans. 77 Presidents since Theodore
Roosevelt have attempted to address the problem of high medical costs, recognizing that low-income families were suffering due to costly hospital and
physician bills. 78 Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to address health insurance
in the social insurance manner that European nations were offering it, and
Harry Truman took up the health insurance fight during his presidency. 79 At
the key moment after World War II when other nations were establishing national health care systems, national health insurance in the United States was
73

See, e.g., National Health Expenditures 2013 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/F842-NARR].
74
Id.
75
To make this information more transparent, the ACA required that W-2 forms include the
value of health insurance as a specific line item. See Form W-2 Reporting of Employer-Sponsored
Health Coverage, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Form-W-2Reporting-of-Employer-Sponsored-Health-Coverage [https://perma.cc/EGU7-GKLH]; see also Robert Pear, To Open Eyes, W-2s List Cost of Providing a Health Plan, N.Y. T IM ES (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/health/to-open-eyes-w-2s-list-cost-of-health-plans.html [https://
perma.cc/Z3BE-LDKN] (reporting on the new W-2 information designed to enlighten employees as
to the value of their health insurance).
76
Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying for National Health Insurance—And
Not Getting It, 21 HEALTH AFF. 88, 88 (2002).
77
See STARR, supra note 31, at 36–37; PAUL STARR, T HE SOCIAL T RANSFORM ATION OF
AM ERICAN MEDICINE 235–89 (1982) [hereinafter STARR, T HE SOCIAL T RANSFORM ATION] (examining political and sociological factors that defeated efforts for a national health insurance program in the early to mid-1900s).
78
See STARR, T HE SOCIAL T RANSFORM ATION, supra note 77, at 243 (discussing Theodore
Roosevelt’s interest).
79
See STARR, supra note 31, at 39–40.
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defeated by a variety of factors, including political and ideological barriers,
public ambivalence about appropriate methods for addressing medical expenses, and the American Medical Association’s “socialized medicine” bugaboo. 80
Instead, health insurance as an employment benefit became an American phenomenon, wherein the federal government encourages employers to
offer health insurance benefits by deeming them a business expense that is
excluded from taxable income. 81 Simultaneously, employees are encouraged to accept this benefit because the value of the health insurance coverage is excluded from taxable income. 82 This subsidy system has been successful from the perspective that a majority of Americans obtain health insurance through their employers (53.9% of the population as of 2013). 83 But
this percentage has been decreasing through the last decade or more, in part
giving rise to the high levels of uninsurance that precipitated the ACA’s enactment. 84
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) has called tax subsidies for
employment-based health insurance the “largest single tax expenditure by
the federal government.” 85 As of 2013, the CBO valued this tax subsidy at
$248 billion, not including the tax deduction taken by self-employed individuals (valued at about $6 billion). 86 Though rarely discussed as such, this
tax subsidy is concrete financial support for access to health care through
subsidized private health insurance. Yet when it is raised as part of health
reform or other political conversations, rather than expressing concern regarding dependency or entitlement, the tax subsidy tends to be critiqued in
terms of moral hazard (insurance overuse), unequal cost burdens (less af80

See id. This is a too-pithy summary of a long history; for an extensive historical and sociological account, see generally STARR, T HE SOCIAL T RANSFORM ATION, supra note 77.
81
See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance,
2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 25–26 (2001) (explaining the history of employerbased health insurance).
82
See I.R.C. § 106(a) (2012) (“[G]ross income of an employee does not include employerprovided coverage under an accident or health plan.”).
83
J ESSICA C. SM ITH & CARLA MEDALIA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at 2 (2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/
library/publications/2014/demo/p60-250.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPX2-P7RX].
84
See, e.g., NAT ’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., EM PLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE: RECENT T RENDS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 2 (2013), http://www.nihcm.org/images/pdf/
Employer-Sponsored-Health-Insurance-v2-data-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K9Z-C28R] (documenting the decline in employer-sponsored health insurance coverage, from 69.3% in 2000 to 58.4% in
2011).
85
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE DEFICIT : 2014 TO 2023, at 244
(2013),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44715-OptionsForReducing
Deficit-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XXG-QEJH].
86
Id.
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fordable for lower wage earners), or fostering inefficiency (employers have
no special expertise as health care intermediaries). 87
The ACA builds on the employment-based private health insurance
system in a number of ways in an effort to achieve universal insurance coverage. 88 For example, large employers (already highly likely to provide health
insurance as an employment benefit) must pay a penalty if they do not offer
health insurance at all or if the insurance they offer is unaffordable, and their
employees purchase tax-subsidized insurance on an exchange. 89 The ACA
further fortifies employment-based insurance, especially for small employers
(those with fewer than fifty employees, which are much less likely to offer
health insurance benefits), 90 by creating special mechanisms for small businesses to offer affordable health insurance benefits to their employees in
small groups, which have historically had to pay higher premiums. 91 These
legislative provisions entrenched reliance on the employer-based, private
insurance model by requiring certain employment benefits, which was historically deemed voluntary on the part of the employer. Further, the “individual mandate” facilitates this entrenchment by increasing the likelihood
that an employee will accept the offered benefit rather than attempt to pocket additional salary. 92

87

See, e.g., ROBERT E. MOFFIT & NINA OWCHARENKO, HERITAGE FOUND., T HE MCCAIN
HEALTH CARE PLAN: MORE POWER TO FAM ILIES 4–6 (2008), http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_
media/2008/pdf/bg2198.pdf [https://perma.cc/EE58-PQ87] (discussing presidential candidate John
McCain’s plan for eliminating federal tax subsidies for health insurance); see also T IM OTHY
STOLTZFUS J OST , DISENTITLEM ENT ? T HE T HREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAM S AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 185–86 (2003) (summarizing critiques of federal tax
policy related to private, employer-based health insurance); Nicholas Drew, Note, Two Federally
Subsidized Health Insurance Programs Are One Too Many: Reconsidering the Federal Income
Tax Exclusion for Employer-Provided Health Insurance in Light of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 54 B.C. L. REV. 2047, 2086–87 (2013) (presenting possible reforms to the
federal tax subsidies for employer-provided health insurance).
88
See generally Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance After
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 885 (2011) (predicting and evaluating the ACA’s impact on employer-sponsored insurance).
89
See ACA § 1513(a), 124 Stat. at 253 (enacting the penalty); State Health Facts, Percent of
Private Sector Establishments That Offer Health Insurance to Employees, by Firm Size, KAISER
FAM ILY FOUND. (2013), http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/firms-offering-coverage-by-size [http://
perma.cc/7HSS-F5PV] [hereinafter State Health Facts] (showing that 95.7% of employers with
more than fifty employees offer health insurance as a benefit).
90
State Health Facts, supra note 89 (34.8% of employers with fewer than fifty employees
offer health insurance as a benefit).
91
For example, small employers receive a tax credit for offering health insurance. See ACA
§ 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 237, amended by HCERA § 10105(e)(1)–(2), 124 Stat. at 906.
92
ACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 244, amended by HCERA § 10106(b), 124 Stat. at 909;
HCERA § 1002, 124 Stat. at 1032. An additional critique of the employer-based health insurance
model is that it depresses wages. Employers tend to stifle wage growth when providing generous
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The ACA also invigorated private health insurance markets by unifying
the rules for individual and small group insurance unrelated to employer benefits. 93 Before the ACA, individual health insurance plans were largely unattainable because insurers demanded very high premiums for such plans and
the offered benefits were highly variable. 94 The ACA increased access to a
private insurance market that was elusive for most Americans by enabling
access to individual insurance through health insurance exchanges, which
standardize the minimum allowable benefits for Qualified Health Plans. 95 The
ACA also leveled the playing field by eliminating common exclusionary
practices such as pre-existing condition clauses. 96
But leveling the playing field would not be enough to facilitate universal
coverage without some kind of financial adjustment, as the individual and
small group markets historically have been prohibitively expensive for lowand middle-income Americans. Consequently, the ACA created federal tax
subsidies for insurance premiums to everyone earning 100% to 400% of the
FPL, or $11,770 to $47,080 for a one-person household. 97 These new tax subsidies for health insurance are estimated to cost $45 billion in 2015 and are
projected to increase to $91 billion by 2017 as implementation of the ACA
gains momentum through upcoming open enrollment periods. 98 These expenses further expand the hidden government assistance for private health
insurance.
The private insurance tax subsidies were challenged in King v. Burwell. 99 In King, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the IRS regulations that
provide tax subsidies to qualifying purchasers in federally run exchanges as

benefits, and employees tend not to perceive the true cost in gross income that the benefit demands. See J OST , supra note 87, at 186.
93
See generally ACA §§ 1002–1004, 2711–2719 (Title I, Part A: Individual and Group Market Reforms).
94
See, e.g., KAISER FAM ILY FOUND. & EHEALTHINSURANCE, UPDATE ON INDIVIDUAL
HEALTH INSURANCE 4–5 & tbls.4 & 5 (2004), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2013/01/update-on-individual-health-insurance.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BG7-9RPG]; cf. Larry Levitt
et al., Data Note: How Has the Individual Insurance Market Grown Under the Affordable Care
Act?, KAISER FAM ILY FOUND., http://kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/data-note-how-has-theindividual-insurance-market-grown-under-the-affordable-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/72JJ-VTTZ]
(last updated May 12, 2015).
95
ACA § 1301, 124 Stat. at 162 (defining Qualified Health Plans); id. § 1302, 124 Stat. at
163 (establishing essential health benefits).
96
ACA § 2704, 124 Stat. at 323.
97
ACA § 1401(a), 124 Stat. at 213, amended by HCERA § 10105(a)–(c), 124 Stat. at 906; see
also HCERA § 1001, 124 Stat. at 1030 (further amending I.R.C. § 36B).
98
Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to John Boehner, Speaker,
U.S. House of Representatives 5 tbl.2 (July 24, 2012), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43471
[https://perma.cc/ZSB4-NFKM].
99
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488.
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a matter of statutory interpretation. 100 This willingness to preserve Congress’s intended role for the subsidies stands in contrast to the Court’s unwillingness to defer to Congress on the Medicaid expansion in NFIB. 101
Even though the Court undermined Medicaid expansion in NFIB, calling
the expansion an impermissibly coercive new program, it displayed a nuanced and deferential understanding of the importance of tax subsidies in
the exchanges in King. 102 Arguably, in King, the Court not only demonstrated a better understanding of the ACA103 but also reflected the politically
preferred status of indirect benefits in private insurance, as compared to
direct public insurance benefits.
Although the continued reliance on (employment-based) private health
insurance is consistent with the narrative of American individualism, Congress expressed through the ACA implicit recognition that most low-tomiddle income Americans simply cannot afford health insurance, even with
the equalizing rules that the ACA imposes on private health insurers. Very
few Americans can afford to purchase private health insurance on the open
market, and the current subsidy numbers underline this fact. Reports indicate that approximately 86% of individuals who purchased health insurance
through exchanges in the 2015 open enrollment period qualified for tax
subsidies, and more than half of them were earning less than 250% of the
FPL. 104 Despite the common public narrative that private health insurance is
consistent with American self-reliance, in reality almost everyone purchasing health insurance, whether individually or through an employer, is receiving some kind of federal government subsidy to be able to afford it.
In sum, the American government provides assistance obtaining health
insurance coverage in two different ways: through highly visible direct benefits and through hidden tax subsidies. Despite the substantial similarities
between the two models, particularly with respect to low-income populations, one has been stigmatized and attacked politically in a way the other
has not. With respect to the poor and near-poor, this differentiation has created two perceived classes of individuals: undesirable dependents who rely
on Medicaid and workers who deserve assistance in participating in the
American dream. The following Part takes a closer look at the self-reliance
100

See id. at 2495–96.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608.
102
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485–87; see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606–07 (noting that “wherever that line
[where persuasion gives way to coercion] may be,” the Medicaid expansion “is surely beyond it”).
103
See Nicole Huberfeld, Heed Not the Umpire (Justice Ginsburg Called NFIB), 15 U. PA. J.
CONST . L. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 43, 44–49 (2013), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1657huberfeld15upajconstlheightscrutiny432013pdf [https://perma.cc/7A7G-VURE] (exploring the
argued misunderstanding of the ACA by the NFIB Court).
104
Pear, supra note 13.
101
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narrative underlying this classification and reveals that the dichotomy between dependents and workers in the context of government assistance in
health insurance is a false one.
II. DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF SELF-RELIANCE
As explored in Part I, politicians have condemned expanding Medicaid
as fostering a culture of dependence, while the recipients of the low-income
subsidies have faced no comparable opposition. This Part demonstrates that
these differing reactions are rooted in the American ideal of self-reliance
and the corollary construction of individuals in need of support as undesirable dependents. According to this narrative, recipients of visible government
assistance are lazy and rely on the government as an alternative to being personally responsible and independent, whereas recipients of hidden government assistance are responsible, wage-earning citizens. These beliefs generate a series of either-or dyads: people are either workers or paupers, independent or dependent, good citizens or bad. Through the use of vulnerability
theory and demographic data, this Part demonstrates that self-reliance is a
myth and exposes this bifurcated view as a false dichotomy. Specifically, this
Part asserts that the distinction between visible and hidden government assistance is an unprincipled dividing line, as the very same individuals will find
themselves qualifying for either form of assistance at any given moment and
moving between them, a phenomenon called “churn.” In establishing this
reality, it becomes clear that having two systems for helping the low-income
population access health care is a needlessly complex and unprincipled
means for financing health care.
A. The American Myth of Self-Reliance and Its Dichotomies
Self-reliance is a long-standing American ideal. 105 The United States
has been cast as the land of opportunity, where anyone from anywhere in
the world can come to create a fortune and participate in “American Excep-

105
See, e.g., DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (1776) (referencing in its title the
American independence ideal); BARLOW, supra note 21, at 115 (discussing Benjamin Franklin’s
writings on individual success and “success literature” generally); RALPH WALDO EM ERSON, SelfReliance, in ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES (1841), http://www.emersoncentral.com/selfreliance.htm [https://
perma.cc/E659-Z4L2]; T HE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 3 (Alexander Hamilton) (Charles R. Kressler
ed., 2003); HERBERT HOOVER, AM ERICAN INDIVIDUALISM 8–9 (1922) (citing the Declaration of
Independence as evidence of the primacy of liberty and self-sufficiency in American culture);
HERBERT HOOVER, T HE CHALLENGE TO LIBERTY 18–21 (1934) (same).
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tionalism.” 106 The narrative of the self-made man, pulled up by his bootstraps, is a familiar trope, often expressed as “individualism,” meaning that
the individual makes his or her own fortune, good or bad. 107 The converse
of self-reliance is, of course, dependence. Because of the high value placed
on (particularly financial) independence, state assistance has been stigmatized and devalued. 108
The concept of self-reliance, as a principle in modern American social
and political discourse, is a myth. Yet, contrary to popular use, the word myth
does not connote something that is completely false. One author describes
this use of the word myth as “a complex of profoundly held attitudes and values which condition the way men view the world and understand their experience.” 109 In her work on vulnerability, Martha Albertson Fineman defines
myth as “a legendary story that invokes gods and heroes and explains a cultural practice or phenomenon.” 110 From this perspective, myths are ideological, not factual. 111 They represent beliefs about the world, not empirical realities. 112 But, though a myth cannot be disproved, it can be studied for its influence on policy, politics, law, and its other societal effects. 113
All societies have myths, 114 which serve a variety of important functions. They define our national identity (both domestically and in relation to
other countries), they provide historical context by giving nations origin stories, they explain social roles and disparities, and they tell us what it means to

106
See Alberto Alesina et al., Why Doesn’t the United States Have a European-Style Welfare
State?, 2001 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 187, 223–24 (discussing this “equality of
opportunity” as a factor in avoiding the sharp class divides of Europe).
107
This idea may have been coined by Alexis de Tocqueville when describing what makes
America unusual among European colonial nations. See ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, T HE LAW AND
ONE MAN AM ONG MANY 4 (1956) (citing 2 ALEXIS DE T OCQUEVILLE, DEM OCRACY IN AM ERICA
119 (1840)). Individualism can have many meanings, and Sutherland suggested two strains of
individualism, rugged individualism and individual freedom individualism; he argued that rugged
individualism disappeared in the 1930s. See id. at 17.
108
See Alesina et al., supra note 106, at 239–40 (discussing that American culture rejects
offering government benefits to the poor because they are perceived as lazy rather than unfortunate).
109
RICHARD WEISS, T HE AM ERICAN MYTH OF SUCCESS: FROM HORATIO ALGER TO NORM AN VINCENT PEALE 3–4 (1988).
110
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEM AN, T HE AUTONOMY MYTH: A T HEORY OF DEPENDENCY 11
(2004).
111
See id. at 13.
112
See id. at 25 (discussing myths as abstractions).
113
Id. at 15 (“Unlike a program or a prediction, a myth cannot be refuted.” (quoting HENRY
T UDOR, POLITICAL MYTH 15–16 (1972))); see also WEISS, supra note 109, at 4 (recognizing the
value and pervasiveness of understanding the self-reliance myth even while refuting it).
114
FINEM AN, supra note 110, at 11.
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be good citizens. 115 Thus, myths are also aspirational: They not only communicate people’s beliefs about how the world is, but they also communicate beliefs about how people think the world should be. 116 The myths of
our own culture tend to be accepted as natural, fundamental truths without
much critical thought. 117 Hence, myths shape cultural worldview and bias
individual perceptions. 118 Moreover, myths tend to support the status quo. 119
Consequently, challenging a nation’s underlying myths to enact social reform can be particularly fraught. 120
In the United States—a country whose origin story involves a revolution
against a tyrannical monarchy 121—self-reliance and independence are among
our most-cherished ideals. 122 The American myth of self-reliance is tied up
with the American dream. 123 According to our country’s mythos, with enough
effort and perseverance, anyone can create the life they want. 124 Survey data
indicate that the American people believe that self-determination and hard
work result in success. 125 This belief also leads Americans to overestimate
their personal accomplishments and to underestimate the contributions of
others. 126 This perspective mirrors the United States’ origin story as a land of
plenty, built from nothing. 127 The idea that hard work leads to success and
that anyone can become self-reliant likewise reflects this nation’s capitalist
115

Id. at 11–12; ROBERT WUTHNOW, AM ERICAN MYTHOS: WHY OUR BEST EFFORTS TO BE
A BETTER NATION FALL SHORT 3 (2006).
116
WUTHNOW, supra note 115, at 3.
117

Id. at 1, 109.
See id. at 1; Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309, 310 (1994) (noting the power of certain expressions
to “carry unspoken assumptions and connotations that can powerfully influence the discourses
they permeate”).
119
FINEM AN, supra note 110, at 16.
120
Id. at 15–16.
121
Id. at 17.
122
STEPHANIE COONTZ , T HE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AM ERICAN FAM ILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA T RAP 69 (2000) (“Self-reliance is one of the most cherished American values.”); Knut
Halvorsen, Symbolic Purposes and Factual Consequences of the Concepts “Self-Reliance” and
“Dependency” in Contemporary Discourses on Welfare, 7 SCANDINAVIAN J. SOC. WELFARE 56,
56 (1998) (“To be self-reliant has been a dominant norm in Western societies since early Christianity.”); id. (“The term ‘self-reliance’ is probably the most dominant term in shaping American
social policy.”); id. at 58 (“Western-oriented capitalistic countries are based on the traditional
American virtue of self-reliance.”); Jennifer A. Sandlin, “It’s All Up to You”: How Welfare-toWork Educational Programs Construct Workforce Success, 54 ADULT EDUC. Q. 89, 89 (2004)
(“There is perhaps no more enduring myth in the United States than the myth of success.”).
123
See Alesina et al., supra note 106, at 223.
124
WEISS, supra note 109, at 3; Sandlin, supra note 122, at 89.
125
See WUTHNOW, supra note 115, at 118 (citing numerous surveys showing similar conclusions); Alesina et al., supra note 106.
126
COONTZ , supra note 122, at 70.
127
Id.
118

2016]

Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance

25

ideals. 128 The American dream is, therefore, a dream of individual achievement. 129 This achievement can then be translated into independence. 130 Beliefs about the importance—and attainability of—“individual independence,
autonomy, and self-sufficiency” are foundational American myths, 131 championed by both liberals and conservatives. 132
The myth of self-reliance has a longstanding history. Ancient Greek philosophers first defined self-sufficiency, and Aristotle queried whether selfreliance is a desirable goal. 133 These ideals came early to the United States.
Seventeenth-century Puritanism advocated hard work and a moral life as the
pathway to success. 134 The primary characters in classic stories of American
self-reliance were the self-made man, 135 individually, and the self-sufficient
family, 136 collectively. For example, these archetypes made regular appearances in McGuffey readers and the writings of Horatio Alger. 137 Even today,
these paradigmatic figures persist. Their legacy can be readily identified in
the beloved children’s book The Little Engine That Could, the story of a
self-made protagonist who succeeded through the power of positive thinking, 138 and in the countless books of the ever-popular self-help industry. 139
Of course, as myths, the notions surrounding autonomy, independence, and
self-reliance are simply widely held beliefs about how the world operates
and do not reflect the realities of social mobility in the United States. 140
Nevertheless, several important observations about the American psyche
and how it shapes the political sphere flow from analyzing these ideologies.
First, the American ideal of self-reliance takes a simplified and primarily economic view of personhood. 141 Economic self-sufficiency becomes
both a proxy and a precondition for other versions of autonomy and inde-

128
See id. at 56 (exploring capitalism as an outgrowth of a one’s ability, and therefore one’s
duty, to provide for one’s family).
129
Halvorsen, supra note 122, at 58.
130
Id.
131
Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy,
and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM . U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 14 (1999).
132
Halvorsen, supra note 122, at 58–59.
133
Robert H. Daugherty & Gerard M. Barber, Self-Sufficiency, Ecology of Work, and Welfare
Reform, 75 SOC. SERV. REV. 662, 663 (2001).
134
Sandlin, supra note 122, at 89–90.
135
WUTHNOW, supra note 115, at 104–05.
136
COONTZ , supra note 122, at 73; FINEM AN, supra note 110, at 21.
137
WUTHNOW, supra note 115, at 105.
138
Id. at 121.
139
Sandlin, supra note 122, at 90.
140
WEISS, supra note 109, at 3; Sandlin, supra note 122, at 89.
141
See Daugherty & Barber, supra note 133, at 662–63 (challenging such an economic view
of personhood).
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pendence. 142 Because myths have strong moral components, being financially independent is also associated with virtue and good moral character.
Both the Puritan and the greater Protestant traditions equated material success with grace and financial ruin with sin. 143 Consequently, self-reliance is
a highly valued trait and characteristic of the ideal American citizen. 144
American notions of self-worth, therefore, are constructed in largely economic terms. 145 In other words, financial worth becomes self-worth.
Second, the moral underpinnings and highly desirable social status of
self-reliance renders economic self-sufficiency a condition of being a good
citizen. Some have argued that “self-sufficiency” is “a precondition for being a member of society in good standing” and “an intrinsic obligation of
healthy adults.” 146 But, given that very few Americans can achieve economic independence without working for someone else, paid labor occupies a
central role in the myth of self-reliance. 147 The myth therefore transforms
into the social obligation to work for compensation. 148 Paid work is thus the
currency of good, moral citizenship in the United States.
Conversely, to not be self-sufficient is to be labeled a failure. In a society that venerates self-reliance, people who are not economically independent are not “fully human participants in society.” 149 The appropriate social
reaction to such individuals is either condemnation, at worst, or pity, at
best. 150 Dependency, though—not simply poverty 151—is the nemesis of
self-reliance. 152 Poverty is an objective state that may at times have certain
virtues, whereas dependency as a condition implies that the individual is not
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FINEM AN, supra note 110, at 22.
WEISS, supra note 109, at 5, 7; Halvorsen, supra note 122, at 58; Sandlin, supra note 122,
at 89–90.
144
FINEM AN, supra note 110, at 22; Halvorsen, supra note 122, at 59.
145
Halvorsen, supra note 122, at 57.
146
Id. at 58 (quoting Charles Murray, LOSING GROUND 140 (1984)).
147
FINEM AN, supra note 110, at 9, 22.
148
Daugherty & Barber, supra 133, at 664. As described elsewhere,
143

If there is indeed a categorical imperative for modern American society, it is the
deeply held belief in the value and universality of work. Americans typically hold
that everyone who is physically and mentally able to work should absolutely do so;
they treat this economic-based self-sufficiency as a moral ontological reality and obligation.
Id. (citations omitted).
149
Id. at 666.
150
FINEM AN, supra note 110, at 34.
151
Poverty was not always negative. Various religions elevate poverty in their dogma; for
example, poverty was venerated by the Catholic Church, but it has become “both a negative personal and social phenomenon.” Daugherty & Barber, supra note 133, at 665.
152
Cf. id. at 662 (referring to dependency and self-sufficiency as “sister concept[s]”).
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a fully developed human being. 153 Just as being self-sufficient signals the
virtue and good moral character of the ideal citizen, being dependent in the
United States implies a defect in character that brings with it inferior social
status. 154 Self-reliance and dependency are understood as inherently incompatible states and thereby dichotomous terms. 155 Yet like its counterpart
self-reliance, dependency has specific meanings and cultural contexts. To
start, dependency also has predominantly economic associations. 156 It
means to be dependent on the state for monetary support. 157 Dependency is
therefore synonymous with welfare dependency. 158 This use of the word is
relatively new, however.
In their work on dependency, Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon identify
“three principal icons of [post-industrial] dependency,” which function in
contrast to the white male worker, who is seen as the ideal citizen: the pauper, the colonial native or slave, and the housewife. 159 The archetypal figure
of most relevance to this Article is the pauper “who lived not on wages but
on poor relief”:
In the strenuous new culture of emergent capitalism, the figure of
the pauper was like a bad double of the upstanding workingman,
threatening the latter should he lag. . . . Paupers were not simply
poor but degraded, their character corrupted and their will sapped
through reliance on charity. . . . While nineteenth-century charity
experts acknowledged that poverty could contribute to pauperization, they also held that character defects could cause poverty.
Toward the end of the century, as hereditarian (eugenic) thought

153

Fraser & Gordon, supra note 118, at 309. As Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon explained,

[T]he issue of welfare is the issue of dependency. It is different from poverty. To be
poor is an objective condition; to be dependent, a subjective one as well . . . . Being
poor is often associated with considerable personal qualities; being dependent rarely
so. [Dependency] is an incomplete state in life: normal in the child, abnormal in the
adult. In a world where completed men and women stand on their own feet, persons
who are dependent—as the buried imagery of the word denotes—hang.
Id. (citing DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, T HE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME: T HE NIXON ADM INISTRATION AND THE FAM ILY ASSISTANCE PLAN 17 (1973)).
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Daugherty & Barber, supra note 133, at 663; Fraser & Gordon, supra note 118, at 320,

155

Fineman, supra note 131, at 17; Halvorsen, supra note 122, at 57.
Halvorsen, supra note 122, at 57.
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caught on, the pauper’s character defects were given a basis in biology. 160
Casting dependents as socially and morally defective secured the independent worker’s superior standing. To achieve full membership in society, then,
one must distinguish oneself from the undesirable classes of dependents. 161
Perhaps the most significant change to come out of the evolving concept of dependency is its relationship to paid work. Whereas wage laborers
were the paradigmatic dependents of the pre-industrial age, the current construction of dependency situates paid work as its juxtapositional opposite.
As a result, individuals who work for money are encouraged to believe they
are achieving self-reliance and therefore superior to individuals who receive
government benefits. 162 The corollary that accompanies the idealization of
paid labor is the devaluation of welfare relief, rendering a person who depends on government benefits a pauper or a parasite. Welfare recipients in
America are regarded as undeserving, second-class citizens who shirk their
responsibility to engage in paid labor. 163
Despite the reality that many government aid recipients also work for
pay, 164 working and receiving government benefits are portrayed as eitheror propositions. 165 According to this construction, each individual person
then chooses between two equally available sources of income, work or
welfare. 166 Put differently, dependency (receiving government benefits) is
construed as fundamentally incompatible with paid work. Thus, if a person
receives welfare benefits, it is presumed that person does not also work. 167
Given that a substantial portion of the American population has jobs that do

160

Id. at 316–17 (citations omitted).
Id. at 318. In more recent times, the stigmatized status of the word “dependency” is clear
from its pathological associations in medicine and psychology, e.g., drug dependency, which then
bled into other notions of dependency, such as the assumption that welfare recipients are also drug
addicts. Id. at 325.
162
Halvorsen, supra note 122, at 59.
163
Alesina et al., supra note 106; Fraser & Gordon, supra note 118, at 315, 329; Halvorsen,
supra note 122, at 59.
164
See infra notes 188–269 and accompanying text (exploring false assumptions that those
who receive government assistance do not engage in work).
165
See Fraser & Gordon, supra note 118, at 328.
166
Id.
167
Fineman, supra note 131, at 17. Moreover, the notion that so-called welfare mothers do
not “work” presumes child-rearing does not count as labor. Fraser & Gordon, supra note 118, at
329. Of course, when upper-class women stay home with their children, they are praised as good
parents. See id. (discussing a “class double standard” of expectations and perceptions of work
between wealthy mothers and poor mothers).
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not pay a living wage, leading workers to also rely on government assistance, this conclusion epitomizes the myth of self-reliance. 168
The American myth of self-reliance can be summarized as follows:
Figure 1: Premises and Conclusions of Self-Reliance
P1: Americans have social and moral duties to work to maintain selfsufficiency and to avoid dependency.
C1: Therefore, if people depend on government assistance, then they are social and moral failures.
P2: Paid workers are not dependents.
C2: Therefore, if people receive government benefits, then they do not work
for pay.
C3: Therefore, people who receive government benefits are social and moral
failures who do not work.

The premises and conclusions above in turn lead to the following dichotomies:
Figure 2: Self-Reliance/Dependency Dichotomies
Self-Reliance
Paid work

Dependency
Government assistance

Active
Self-sustaining

Passive
Parasitic

Independent
Worker
Producer

Dependent
Pauper
Consumer

168
Fifteen percent of the U.S. population lived at or below the FPL as of 2013, Distribution of
the Total Population by Federal Poverty Level (Above and Below 100% FPL), KAISER FAM ILY
FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/population-up-to-139-fpl [https://perma.cc/M27D-3RGF],
and 34% of the population lived at or below 200% of the FPL, Distribution of the Total Population by Federal Poverty Level (Above and Below 200% FPL), KAISER FAM ILY FOUND., http://
kff.org/other/state-indicator/population-up-to-200-fpl [https://perma.cc/Z84B-Q6L2]. See also
BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIM ED: ON (NOT ) GETTING BY IN AM ERICA 4–6 (2001)
(reporting the impossibility of living on minimum wage in various geographic regions with different types of jobs); Lauren Eyster, How Do We Grow Our Economy When Most of the Jobs Are
Low Wage and Low Skill?, URBAN INST . (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.urban.org/urban-wire/howdo-we-grow-our-economy-when-most-jobs-are-low-wage-and-low-skill [https://perma.cc/4V4DMD9F] (discussing the concentration of below-federal poverty level jobs in the post-recession job
market). Living wage should be distinguished from minimum wage. See Jared Bernstein, Minimum Wage: Who Makes It?, N.Y. T IM ES: T HE UPSHOT (June 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/06/10/upshot/minimum-wage.html [https://perma.cc/RR7X-23MP] (discussing demographic
data of those who earn minimum wage); Ben Casselman, When Living Wage Is Minimum Wage,
FIVET HIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:25 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/when-living-wageis-minimum-wage [https://perma.cc/Z85B-H3WF] (explaining why studying minimum wage must
include studying both minimum wage earners and those who earn slightly more to get a full picture of a living wage).
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Bad citizen

These myths and their corresponding beliefs affect our laws and social
policies. Social myths, like the myth of self-reliance, are powerful narratives because they are legitimizing. They provide the relevant backdrop for
the current state of our culture and society and they reinforce the notion that
our long-standing social structures are fair and just. The self-reliance myth
tells us that our accomplishments are earned through hard work and virtuous choices. 169 As one author stated, “We simply feel better about ourselves
and our society if we believe our successes in life are not the result of some
random or unjust forces—which means that stories about self-made men
and women fit well with how we believe, and we want to believe, the world
works.” 170 It also tells us that those failing to meet the ideal of selfreliance—those who are dependent—have likewise earned their lot in life
and deserve their current predicament because of their laziness or their
moral shortcomings. 171 As a result, acting with self-interest is not selfcentered or greedy but rather an act of personal responsibility. 172
Although there may not be a strong sense of collective responsibility in
the United States, poverty nonetheless constitutes a well-recognized social
and political problem. Yet the response has been to help only those deemed
deserving of aid. Consequently, lawmakers and policymakers have divided
the poor into distinct groups: unfortunates who merit assistance, and parasites who warrant begrudging and limited help. 173 Those individuals who
deserve assistance will be familiar to many as the “deserving poor”: the elderly, children, widows, the disabled—those society has deemed blameless
in their poverty. 174
By contrast, the undeserving poor do not merit governmental support
because they are deemed poor by choice. 175 According to this construction,
dependency is in an individual character defect or pathology. 176 The need
for help is not a product of misfortune or circumstances but rather the result
of personal failings. It follows that the undeserving poor are by definition
unworthy of assistance. 177 After all, why should the government help those
169
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who do not help themselves? The government need not intervene; their station is a personal—not a societal—failure. 178 Hence, the myth of self-reliance
serves to maintain the status quo by assuring potential reformers that there is
no need for widespread social, legal, or political change: the wealthy and
powerful deserve their successes and the impoverished and disempowered
deserve their struggles. 179 In this view, the goal of good social policy is to
differentiate the deserving poor from the undeserving paupers.
The opposition to government assistance has created a corresponding
preference for privatization. 180 Because popular wisdom holds that the private market thrives with less legal and regulatory oversight, deregulation
and small government have now become popular public policy goals. 181
The backlash against government benefits and the push toward privatization
offer another set of useful dichotomies for analyzing the post-ACA health
care system: private/public, work/welfare, free market/government, and personal/collective responsibility.
Among the visible and hidden forms of government assistance described
in Part I, only the one strongly associated with dependency—Medicaid—has
been stigmatized. The program has faced such stigma that even individuals in
great need have been hesitant to accept assistance. Moreover, ongoing hostility toward public benefits generally—and Medicaid specifically—is evident
from the opposition to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, described above. 182
As discussed, excepting King, no such animosity accompanies the lowincome subsidies. Revisiting the myth-enforcing dichotomies above helps
to explain this divided approach to health care financing.
Consider first Medicaid recipients. Because they rely on the government for health care benefits, they are presumed to be social and moral failures, as demonstrated by the stigma associated with the program. Next, regardless of whether Medicaid recipients are actually working, it is assumed
they do not have jobs. People on Medicaid are presumed to be parasitic dependents, the undertone of which is that they are bad Americans. It is no
surprise, then, that proposals to reform Medicaid have included employment initiatives designed to spur recipients into self-reliance, and recent
gubernatorial efforts to bend the ACA to the right have included work178
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search proposals. 183 For example, Arizona Governor Doug Ducey recently
approved restrictions on his state’s existing Medicaid expansion that would
require the newly eligible to be employed in order to continue to qualify
and would terminate their benefits after five years (presumably to prevent
“dependency”). 184
The persistent employer-provided benefits system, despite substantial
hidden government subsidies, 185 can also be viewed through the lens of selfreliance. Workers are understood as personally responsible, self-sustaining,
and independent—ideal Americans—because they “earn” access to health
insurance via their employment. Health insurance and meaningful health
care access is then something primarily reserved for the “good” working
population. Thus, the dichotomy of “good” workers and “bad” dependents
is an American myth that applies with equal force to the health care sphere
as in other questions of government assistance.
Moreover, the political preference for privatization as a means for addressing inequalities was clearly part of the ACA’s architecture, 186 which
relied on employer-provided benefits and distinctly favored the private sector. Further, with respect to benefits to the poor, the low-income subsidies—
which can be used to purchase health insurance on the private market—
have created far less friction than the ACA’s attempt at a public option,
Medicaid expansion. Consequently, the ACA expressed a preference for
purchasing private health insurance—even if highly subsidized—over government-provided benefits. This preference for private markets flies in the
face of long-standing evidence that the administrative costs for private
health insurers are higher than those for Medicare or Medicaid. 187 One can
183
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therefore see the public versus private dichotomy played out in health care
with the preference for the low-income subsidies, despite the questionable
economics of this private market structure.
The dependency versus self-reliance narrative in health care is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it stigmatizes recipients of government assistance so significantly that they may choose not to reap the benefits of those initiatives. Individuals who qualify for Medicaid may reject the
only available gateway to needed health care out of the fear of being stigmatized. Second, it provides politicians with a very powerful discourse for
not supporting the ACA’s legislative principle of universality, which capitalizes on the well-worn rhetoric of American self-reliance and the construction of dependency as a social harm. Professor Fineman’s vulnerability theory, however, reveals that self-reliance is a myth and all humans are constantly vulnerable to becoming dependent.
B. Debunking the Dividing Line
The American myth of self-reliance valorizes self-sufficiency and independence and positions dependency in conflict with paid labor. Its theoretical roots lie in the ideals of free will and personal responsibility for fortunes and misfortunes. These myths and belief systems have infiltrated the
debates surrounding health care reform and are readily discernible in both
the hostility to the Medicaid expansion and the support for the low-income
subsidy. A closer examination of these beliefs reveals that they are both theoretically and practically unsound.
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http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/05/27/the-post-launch-problem-the-affordable-care-acts-persistent
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1. Dividing Line as Theoretically Unprincipled
For a theoretical excavation of the myth of self-reliance, this subsection looks to Professor Fineman’s work on universal vulnerability. Her work
takes aim at the centrality of autonomy in American life and culture, as well
as the accompanying trend away from collective responsibility and toward
privatization, deregulation, and reliance on the free market as the proper
methods of social reform.
According to Fineman, the myths described above have had a negative
impact on American society. She explains that American beliefs surrounding the desirability and attainability of self-sufficiency have affected the
way in which we understand equality, as well as the role of the state. 188 As
discussed above, the myth of self-reliance holds that, through enough hard
work and discipline, independence is available to everyone. This particular
conception of autonomy is incompatible with vulnerability and dependence;
it assumes that decisionmakers are independent actors capable of making
their own unconstrained choices. Society equates failure with personal
shortcomings and blames dependency on the very government programs
designed to help those in need, thereby avoiding important issues of social
justice. 189 The move away from government aid privatizes issues of dependency by situating them as problems for individual families and not for
society as a whole. 190 Blaming others (and their families) for their dependency allows the state to avoid taking collective action to remedy social inequality. 191
By valuing autonomy over substantive equality, Americans have developed a preference for formal equality (treating people the same) and for
a limited role of the state. 192 The current American legal construction of
equality, particularly in the context of equal protection, is, therefore, narrow,
identity-based, and “takes only a limited view of what should constitute
governmental responsibility in regard to social justice issues.” 193 Pursuant
to this kind of thinking, government benefits are undesirable because they
single out certain groups for assistance—thereby violating formal equality—and because they require an expanded role for the government. The
188
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backlash against government intervention within the past thirty years has
been socially damaging, as the programs being attacked and rolled back had
tangible benefits for the disadvantaged. 194 The result of the backlash has
been an unresponsive government that is unwilling to address the structural
barriers that perpetuate existing disparities. 195 Thus, for Americans to
achieve meaningful reform, we must be willing to rethink our foundational
myths. 196 In particular, Fineman urges us to reconsider the current relationships between autonomy, dependency, and equality. 197
Vulnerability theory provides a tool for reassessing the myth of selfreliance. Fineman argues that the proper construction of equality is equal
opportunity, not formal equal treatment. 198 She contends that the current
construction of autonomy is a fiction because of humanity’s shared vulnerability. She therefore challenges many of the established ideological dichotomies underlying the myth of self-reliance (described earlier in this Part). 199
By advocating a theory that presents dependency as both inevitable and
universal, Fineman argues in favor of a heightened sense of collective responsibility and a state that is responsive to the needs of its citizenry because no human being is—or can be—truly independent. 200
Dependency does not exist in a single metric: it is a complex concept
with varying axes and degrees. 201 For the purposes of this discussion of health
care, biological and economic dependency are most relevant. The inevitability of biological dependency is perhaps the easiest to understand because all
have experienced it firsthand. As Fineman explains, “Far from being pathological, avoidable, and the result of individual failings, a state of dependency
is a natural part of the human condition and is developmental in nature.” 202
We were all dependent as children and we may well become dependent again
through old age or disability. Hence, dependency is simply part of being human. 203 Moreover, because everyone is vulnerable to injury, disease, aging,
and disability, we could all find ourselves dependent at a moment’s notice. 204
194
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Yet although we are all universally vulnerable, depending on our bodily and
environmental conditions, we are all at varying degrees of that vulnerability. 205 Although the ubiquity of biological dependency is hard to refute, the
inevitability of other kinds of dependency, like economic dependency, is not
generally recognized. 206
Yet economic dependency is almost as universal as biological dependency. Despite the United States’ relative affluence and opportunity, one in
six adult Americans and one in five American children live in poverty. 207
Moreover, almost all Americans depend on some kind of financial support
outside of their immediate family to survive. 208 By objective measures,
people who work for pay are not inherently independent or self-reliant. 209
The choice for the vast majority of Americans is, therefore, not between
dependency or self-reliance but rather between being dependent on the state
or being dependent on employment. 210 Moreover, Fineman points out that
even the highest-level CEO’s success still depends on the labor of secretaries and truck drivers. 211 Because we are all interdependent, we can never
assume that any one person is completely self-sufficient. 212 As another author explains, “The problem is not dependency per se, but society’s labeling
of some groups of people in particular circumstances as dependent.” 213
Furthermore, despite the dichotomies described previously in section
A, paid work and dependence on government benefits are not mutually exclusive. Particularly, many people in the United States either do not have
access to paid work or do not have access to a living wage. 214 When the
number of jobs that are available goes down, individuals who would prefer
to be working must join the ranks of the unemployed. As of 2014, there
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were approximately two job seekers for every available job. 215 Put another
way, at least half of the population who wanted to work could not; or, the
only available jobs were low-pay, low-skill, hourly-wage jobs that often do
not offer benefits at all, or not at affordable cost. 216 Government assistance
is crucial for those people. And for every percentage increase in the rate of
unemployment, the number of Medicaid enrollees goes up by one million
people. 217 The political position described in Part I, that Medicaid is therefore inappropriate for able-bodied, single adults, rings especially hollow.
Furthermore, low-paying jobs do little to remove families from poverty. 218
To put it bluntly, working for pay does not guarantee self-reliance. 219
Based on these realities, self-reliance, at least as constructed in the
American ethos, is a myth. It is a myth both in the sense that it provides a
socio-cultural backdrop for many of our laws and social policies (as described in section A of Part II) and in the sense that it is untrue (as described
directly above). The promise of self-reliance that permeates American cultural life is both impossible—because of the universality of dependency and
vulnerability—and undesirable—because such a worldview excludes anyone who is not a fully functioning, unencumbered adult. 220
As discussed earlier, assuming that all individuals are autonomous
stagnates reform because people are assumed to get what they deserve. 221
This assumption constrains political power because any effort to change the
status quo appears to either limit freedom or engage in redistribution. 222
Alternatively, construing autonomy as a goal for public policy favors efforts
to create equal opportunities for all Americans. 223 According to the latter
view, independence occurs when a person has access to basic resources al-
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lowing participation in both society’s benefits and burdens. 224 Lacking necessities, like food, shelter, and clothing, constrains the choices available to
an individual. 225 Pursuant to this framework, autonomy is not an assumed
state of the human condition but rather an aspiration.
Additionally, much like dependency and vulnerability, subsidy is also
universal. Because dependency at varying points and to varying extents in
our lives is inevitable, reliance on the government for support is likewise
inevitable. 226 Fineman’s theory of universal vulnerability, therefore, also
captures the notion of universal subsidy. 227 Frequently subsidies are understood as direct economic or monetary assistance, yet subsidies can come in
many different forms and from many different sources. 228 Thus, subsidies
include both visible government wealth transfers, as in Medicare and Medicaid, as well as hidden wealth transfers, such as tax benefits. 229
From this perspective, no one in modern society is truly economically
or socially self-sufficient. 230 Fineman puts it bluntly: “[W]e all live subsidized lives.” 231 Yet not all subsidies are stigmatized or linked with dependency. 232 Insofar as various subsidies have been associated with visible government assistance, as in the case of the Medicaid program, they have been
linked to socially undesirable dependency and construed as antithetical to
self-reliance. 233 By contrast, subsidies that tend to perpetuate wealth and privilege are rarely labeled as such. 234 Both politicians and the American public
tend to apply different standards of self-reliance to different situations. In particular, Fineman points out that assistance for disaster relief or for corporate
failures is not met with the same kinds of resistance as government aid to the
poor. 235 The real puzzle then lies in why some subsidies face significant stigma while others remain insulated from public scrutiny. 236
224
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Consequently, autonomy as a central governing principle envisions a
particular role for the state. The issue for reformers is not to eradicate dependency or subsidies but rather to provide for the citizenry. 237 Fineman
makes a claim for collective responsibility. 238 She therefore argues for substantive, as opposed to formal, equality. This notion of equality seeks to eliminate disparities and to minimize oppression and exploitation. 239 It sets a
floor of basic resources and dignity under which individual citizens cannot
drop. 240 Ensuring this brand of equality requires the active involvement of
the state. 241 True equality of opportunity, therefore, obligates the government to provide access to social goods, such as wealth, health, employment,
or security, and to ensure that the opportunities are evenly distributed so that
no person or groups of persons are unduly privileged while others have few
or no opportunities. 242 Replacing formal equal treatment by the state with
equality of opportunity, Fineman posits, can actually enhance liberty and
freedom by providing individuals who are limited under the current regime
with more meaningful choices. 243
In sum, vulnerability theory is a particularly powerful tool to advocate
for social justice for the poor, who lack status before the Supreme Court and
Congress as an independent antidiscrimination category, and who lack political power in general. 244 The theory applies particularly well to issues of
health care access for lower income Americans, because it is exactly the
kind of social good that would be included in a meaningful construction of
substantive equality. Moreover, health care access intersects with dependency in a number of important ways. People with limited access to medical
treatment experience heightened levels of vulnerability. Because of their
limited resources, they may wait until a condition has progressed relatively
far before obtaining health care or may go without treatment altogether.
Thus, people whose economic status restricts their health care access are
also more likely to find themselves sick or disabled. That is, they are more
likely to end up in states of biological dependency.
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This lens reveals that the ACA’s attempt to provide universal health insurance coverage is not merely a contentious partisan issue but rather an
essential element to recognizing and responding to the inherent vulnerability of all Americans. 245 Understanding health care reform through vulnerability theory emphasizes the law’s equalizing and social justice effects, which
are possible when the myth of self-reliance is unveiled so that policy can
move toward a more just and responsive state. Post-ACA, poorer individuals have access to two different avenues of government assistance: the expanded Medicaid program and the low-income subsidy for private insurance—initiatives that can be understood as examples of the state responding
to the concerns of its vulnerable citizens.
These programs also powerfully demonstrate that no bright line exists
between work and welfare. First, two-thirds of the uninsured have at least
one full-time or part-time worker in their household. 246 Work no longer
equates to health care benefits. Second, the ACA’s expansion will render
Medicaid the primary health insurance provider for the working poor. As
expanded, Medicaid will cover non-elderly, non-disabled adults regardless
of their work status. 247 Many of the working poor do not receive employerprovided benefits, or are offered benefits that are too expensive, 248 rendering Medicaid’s public insurance benefit a foundational benefit for the health
care access of Americans under the age of sixty-five. 249 Third, one study
found that, if the Supreme Court had ruled against the government in its
2015 King v. Burwell decision, of the individuals who would have lost their
subsidies, 46% work full-time and 35% work part-time. 250 A substantial por245
As noted above, one in six Americans and one in five children live in poverty, which is an
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tion of working Americans must depend on government supports, visible and
hidden, to access private health care, especially given that employersponsored insurance has been decreasing over the last eight years. 251 Fourth,
the phenomenon called “churn,” discussed in subsection 2, shows that public or private insurance status is a false indicator of “self-reliance.”
2. Dividing Line as Empirically Unprincipled
On one dimension, the ACA’s statutory drive for universality demonstrates the responsive state addressing inevitable human vulnerability, regardless of work status. But, on a different dimension, the statute’s perpetuation of the divided public versus private, dependent versus worker system
extends the dichotomies explored earlier in this Part. These dyads do not
reflect reality, as many Americans simultaneously work and rely on public
benefits. More pointedly, contrary to the “able-bodied” rhetoric, most individuals who are newly eligible for Medicaid are also employed or in a
household with a worker. 252 Although expansion-resistant politicians have
cast Medicaid recipients as undesirable dependents who do not deserve
governmental assistance, 253 individuals receiving the low-income subsidy
have been immune from such labels. This discrepancy is attributable to the
differing views surrounding visible and hidden government benefits. This
subsection shows that the dividing line between individuals on Medicaid
and individuals receiving the low-income subsidy breaks down both on the
theoretical and the data-driven, applied level.
251

See Jessica Vistnes et al., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, MEDICAL
EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY INSURANCE COM PONENT CHARTBOOK 2014, at vii (2015), http://
meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/survey_comp/MEPSICChartbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF4T-UUMV].
One survey found:
Continuing a trend that began in 2008, the percentage of employees working in an
establishment where insurance was offered fell from 84.9 percent in 2013 to 83.2
percent in 2014, a decline of 1.7 percentage points. Between 2003 and 2013, the
percentage of employees at firms of all sizes who worked for employers that offered
health insurance declined from 86.8 percent to 84.9 percent, with all the decline occurring between 2008 and 2012.
Id.
252

KEY FACTS ABOUT THE UNINSURED, supra note 26, at 5 fig.4. In fact,

Most of the uninsured are in low-income working families. In 2013, nearly 8 in 10
[of the uninsured] were in a family with a worker, and nearly 6 in 10 have family income below 200% of poverty. Reflecting the more limited availability of public
coverage, adults have been more likely to be uninsured than children.
Id. at 1.
253
See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text (providing statements from politicians regarding the worthiness of Medicaid recipients).
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The ACA’s benefits for lower-income Americans provide a real-time
case study for the arbitrary line drawn between socially acceptable and socially stigmatized government subsidies. Because the expanded Medicaid
program provides visible government assistance and has been historically
associated with welfare, which signals dependency, it has faced political
opposition. But because the low-income subsidy is hidden assistance that
facilitates purchasing health insurance on the private market, it has escaped
self-reliance scrutiny. Even an individual subsidized completely—having all
health insurance costs paid by the government—does not experience the
stigma and political rhetoric of self-reliance scrutiny like the person who
receives Medicaid benefits.
The artificial dividing line between people enrolled in Medicaid and
people receiving low-income subsidies is not just theoretically false, it is
quantifiably erroneous. Recall that Medicaid, as expanded, provides benefits to any non-elderly individual who earns up to 138% of the FPL and that
the low-income subsidies are available, on a sliding scale, to individuals
making 100% to 400% of the FPL. Because income and employment (with
its attendant benefits) are variable, especially for hourly and low-wage workers, individuals bounce back and forth between the two vectors of health insurance, a phenomenon called “churn.” 254 Before the ACA, low-income
Americans were more likely to churn in and out of Medicaid, with no other
affordable insurance mechanism existing to assist them when Medicaid eligibility ceased. Now, churn will occur between Medicaid and subsidized
private insurance plans on the exchanges in states that have expanded Medicaid eligibility, which is less harmful to the insured. 255 Churn is estimated
to affect 50% of the newly insured Medicaid population. 256
Churn is not a new problem; in 2003, one prominent article identified
seven different patterns of insurance coverage instability. 257 The problem of
churn and its economic and medical effects was well known when the ACA
was enacted. But churn has been exacerbated by the divided structure of
254
Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How Changes in
Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth Between Medicaid and Insurance Exchanges, 30
HEALTH AFF. 228, 228 (2011).
255
Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Medicaid and Marketplace Eligibility Changes Will Occur
Often in All States; Policy Options Can Ease Impact, 33 HEALTH AFF. 700, 705 (2014).
256
See Sommers & Rosenbaum, supra note 254, at 232; see also BUETTGENS ET AL., supra
note 248 (reiterating the numbers involved in churn from the Sommers and Rosenbaum 2011
study); Sommers et al., supra note 255, at 704 (reporting year-long continuous coverage rates of
approximately 50%, implying churn rates of a similar percentage).
257
See generally Pamela Farley Short & Deborah R. Graefe, Battery-Powered Health Insurance? Stability in Coverage of the Uninsured, 22 HEALTH AFF. 244 (2003) (discussing the different patterns of insurance coverage instability then present).
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universal health insurance coverage under the ACA. 258 In the past few
years, studies first predicted and then documented the phenomenon of churn
in the era of the ACA, which is (counterintuitively) worse in richer states
because they have more people living near or just above the FPL. 259 Poorer
states have more people living below the poverty level, so their coverage is
less likely to change with small gains or losses in income. 260
Whether an individual receives public or private insurance under the
ACA’s design is dependent on income, which appears a reasonable metric
on the surface. But consider how churn highlights the illogical line between
public and private insurance, with all of their underlying implications: a
person who earns 140% of the FPL obtains private insurance on an exchange and is given generous subsidies for insurance premiums and any
cost-sharing, but a person who earns 138% of the FPL qualifies for Medicaid and is receiving generous governmental insurance coverage (that largely forbids cost-sharing without a special waiver). At least one of these two
people will, in any twelve-month period, move between Medicaid and subsidized private insurance. In non-expansion states, the person earning 138%
of FPL will fall into the “penultimate poor” category, meaning no Medicaid
expansion coverage exists once he or she churns out of private insurance.
Further, consider the income difference (or lack thereof). In 2015, the
FPL was $11,770 in income per year for a single individual, 261 so 138% of
the FPL was $16,242.60. That individual earns $1353.55 per month, or
$338.38 per week, or $67.67 per day in a five-day workweek (slightly more
than a person earning minimum wage). By comparison, 140% of the FPL is
$16,478 in annual income, or $1373.16 per month, or $343.29 per week, or
$68.65 per day in a five-day workweek. In other words, the difference between the low-income subsidy and Medicaid is only several hundred dollars
per year, the equivalent of a few days’ pay. The person earning 140% of the
FPL will then move from being deemed a self-reliant private insurance purchaser to a dependent Medicaid beneficiary after missing only a few days of
work.
Studies have shown that individuals earning at the level of the FPL are
the most likely to experience fluctuations in income and employment that
result in churn. 262 Indeed, for someone earning 100% of the FPL, one day’s
258

Sommers et al., supra note 255, at 705.
See id. at 704; see also BUETTGENS ET AL., supra note 248, at 5 (“To place churning’s
total magnitude in perspective, the 29.4 million people who will change coverage systems from
year to year equal 31 percent of the estimated 95.9 million who will receive either Medicaid or
exchange subsidies during any given year.”).
260
See Sommers et al., supra note 255, at 704–05.
261
80 Fed. Reg. 3236 (Jan. 22, 2015).
262
Sommers et al., supra note 255, at 704.
259
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work is all it would take to lose private insurance and either enroll in Medicaid or lose coverage, depending on the state. To wit: a person earning the
2015 FPL of $11,770 per year, or $980.33 per month, or $245 per week, or
$49.04 per day (in a five-day workweek) will lose subsidized coverage by
missing just one day of work, given that an individual earning minimum
wage would gross $58 in one day. By this admittedly simplistic calculation,
one day’s work is the difference between insurance and non-insurance in
non-expansion states, and three-and-a-half days’ work is the difference in
expansion states.
This distinction between self-reliance and dependence is completely
arbitrary, yet very real given that people move—predictably—in and out of
the safety net due to job status and other circumstances often beyond individual control. The difference between 140% and 138% of the FPL is not
one between self-reliance and dependence. Missing work because of a brief
illness or a family obligation could easily result in churn from the private to
the public system. Somewhat ironically, the penultimate poor in nonexpansion states are like Medicaid beneficiaries, who historically have cycled between Medicaid and non-insurance. Now, people enrolled in subsidized qualified health plans on the exchanges will also cycle between insurance and non-insurance in non-expansion states, even though the ACA intended Medicaid to catch all who churn off of public insurance to facilitate
universality.
Furthermore, many Americans who are not currently in need of visible
government assistance in obtaining health care could find themselves enrolled in Medicaid as the result of circumstances such as pregnancy and
childbirth, disability, or old age. One aspect of Medicaid that renders its
safety net effective is continual open enrollment, unlike the private insurance on the exchanges. Even prior to the ACA, Medicaid provided medical
assistance to substantial numbers of pregnant women, funding half of the
births in the United States and two-thirds of unplanned pregnancies (half of
pregnancies are unplanned in the United States). 263 The program also covered over one-third of American children as of 2012. 264 As expanded, Medicaid will also cover many non-elderly, non-disabled adults regardless of
their work status. 265 Finally, as the primary funder of long-term care and
mental health care in the United States, Medicaid plays a significant role in
263
Huberfeld & Roberts, Empirical, supra note 10, at 551; Huberfeld & Roberts, Great Society, supra note 10, at 4.
264
Huberfeld & Roberts, Empirical, supra note 10, at 551–52; Huberfeld & Roberts, Great
Society, supra note 10, at 4.
265
Huberfeld & Roberts, Empirical, supra note 10, at 546; Huberfeld & Roberts, Great Society, supra note 10, at 3–4.

2016]

Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance

45

the event of disability and at the end of life. 266 Thus, Medicaid is the primary provider of health care for inevitably, though unforeseeably, dependent
persons. Even an economically stable person who currently relies on the
private market could also land in the public system as the result of a life
event causing either temporary or permanent dependence.
Not only is the dividing line between visible and hidden government
assistance empirically unprincipled, it is also harmful. 267 Maintaining two
completely distinct, complex programs for effectively the same population
generates complications and efficiency costs as those individuals bounce
between the different systems. Just when an individual has obtained one
type of benefit and become acquainted with its rules and intricacies, that
individual may be forced to seek a different type of benefit from a different
source because of a one-day change in income. Churn is administratively
inefficient and costly for the government and for insurance enrollees. 268
Churn also causes insurance loss and provider change when moving between plans, leading to less efficient and less effective medical care if not
total loss of care. 269 And, churn exposes the insured to financial risk when
health care must be obtained without insurance coverage. But churn is a
symptom of the larger problem, which is the need to overcome the myth of
self-reliance in policymaking, especially in the health care sphere.
As explained in the above sections, the myth of self-reliance permeates
American culture, including the health insurance system, perpetuating false
dichotomies. Individuals who receive government benefits through Medicaid are undesirable “dependents,” whereas those who obtain private health
insurance—even if heavily subsidized—are good workers and productive
citizens. This division proves false both theoretically and through demographic data. All human beings are potentially vulnerable and dependency
266

Huberfeld & Roberts, Empirical, supra note 10, at 552–53; Huberfeld & Roberts, Great
Society, supra note 10, at 4–5.
267
Sara Rosenbaum, Clash of the Titans: Medicaid Meets Private Health Insurance, 15 YALE
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 197, 203 (2015). As one scholar explained,
The great advance of the ACA is that, as with Massachusetts, the law has the potential to dramatically reduce periods without coverage. But the bifurcation of the affordable insurance system means that breaks are essentially baked into the design of
the program unless effective mitigation strategies can be developed. And coverage
breaks are a major cause for concern—not only because of their implications for the
continuity and quality of coverage and care but also because of their impact on risk
estimates. As people cycle on and off coverage, the risk also increases that they will
delay necessary health care until insurance is subsequently regained, a danger to
their health and an added element of financial risk for the private insurance market.
Id.
268
269

See BUETTGENS ET AL., supra note 248, at 2, 7–8.
See Sommers & Rosenbaum, supra note 254, at 232.
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is universal. Moreover, individuals who benefit from Medicaid and the subsidies are largely the same populations, with low-income Americans moving from one system to the other and back again. Yet on one side of the line
there is political and social support, and on the other there has been vitriolic
opposition and self-reliance scrutiny. Not only is the current distinction between visible and hidden assistance for the poor unprincipled, it is also socially damaging, as time and resources are wasted and medical care is missed
when individuals move between the two systems. Hence, health care is not an
opportunity to be seized by the self-reliant individualist but rather a public
good that will be needed by all, as underlined by the ACA’s universality. To
that end, the following Part proposes erasing this false dividing line.
III. MOVING BEYOND MYTHS: T OWARD A UNIFIED SYSTEM
Having established that self-reliance in health care is a myth and that,
by consequence, the dividing line between visible and hidden government
assistance is unprincipled and perhaps even harmful to patients, this Article
now turns to addressing this seemingly intractable and uniquely American
problem. This Part proposes that Congress should abandon the bifurcated
insurance system continued by the ACA for low-income Americans and
adopt a unified structure that reflects the intended universality of the ACA.
This Part therefore explores the benefits and drawbacks of a single
program of government assistance for health insurance, either based in the
ACA’s tax subsidies or in Medicaid, to facilitate a simpler, more effective,
and perhaps even less stigmatized, system of support for the poor. This proposal works with the structure of the ACA because it appears to be on solid
legal ground in the post-NFIB and post-King era. 270 The authors recognize,
however, that the ACA may be itself an interim step toward a more radically
revised health care system, perhaps one less path-dependent and complex.
This exploration is deliberately limited in light of the political realities of
the current Congress, which seems hopelessly deadlocked on most matters
health care-related.
A. Subsidy-Based Unified System
One possibility for a unified health insurance system, given the current
structure of health insurance under the ACA, would be to eliminate the historically contentious Medicaid program entirely and to instead provide access to health insurance exclusively through tax subsidies. Such an ap270
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
123 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
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proach has positive and negative ramifications from a variety of viewpoints,
including personal and programmatic stigma perpetuation, access to care,
administrative matters, and cost control implications.
Within the context of this Article’s exploration of the myth of selfreliance, a subsidy-based unified program would likely thwart a significant
amount of dependency rhetoric and its attendant imposed stigma. Under
such a system, anyone who needed government assistance to pay for health
insurance would receive the more politically accepted hidden government
assistance of tax subsidies. As a result, no one would be labeled an undeserving able-bodied dependent on the basis of need for government assistance when obtaining health insurance. 271
The absence of personal stigma could in turn have a positive effect on
health care access by stimulating enrollment by those already eligible. As
noted, eligible individuals may avoid enrolling in Medicaid because they do
not want to be classified as socially undesirable dependents. 272 The absence
of comparable animosity toward the hidden subsidy indicates that more
people may be willing to accept such benefits when they qualify. In fact, the
ACA contains a provision that combats Medicaid’s stigma by facilitating
enrollment through “no wrong door” policies, meaning a person who applies through an exchange but who qualifies for Medicaid will be directed
appropriately to Medicaid, and vice versa. This unified enrollment mechanism is administratively efficient, but it also hides the Medicaid application,
creating an equalizing and less stigmatizing effect that encourages enrollment. 273 Thus, government assistance through hidden benefits could capture
more individuals in need than visible government assistance.
In addition, private insurance historically offers a wider network of
health care providers to policyholders than Medicaid. In part, this phenomenon is related to private insurance paying providers more than both Medicare and Medicaid on average. In part, the wider network is related to the
stigma that Medicaid beneficiaries and the program itself face in physicians’
offices, where they are often labeled as noncompliant and difficult, among
271

Proponents of the earned income tax credit (“EITC”) have made similar arguments. See
Anne Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform,
108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 565 (1995) (“[A]dvocates claim[] tax-based transfers can reduce the
stigma and social isolation associated with welfare.”).
272
Empirical data indicate that stigma can have a negative effect on Medicaid enrollment. See
Jennifer Stuber & Karl Kronebusch, Stigma and Other Determinants of Participation in TANF
and Medicaid, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGM T . 509, 526 (2004) (“Identity stigma—concerns
about being labeled by welfare stereotypes—decreased participation . . . in Medicaid.”).
273
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2201,
124 Stat. 119, 289–91 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. tits. 18, 20–21, 25–26, 28–
31, 35, 42 (2012)) (enacting such policies).
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other epithets. Health care providers often perceive Medicaid as more administratively difficult than private insurance, as states can be very slow to pay in
addition to paying lower rates than other forms of health insurance. 274 Accordingly, having low-income populations in private insurance plans could
increase their access to health care providers in meaningful ways because
they would bypass the Medicaid stigma both personally and programmatically. But this anti-stigma effect on access could be defeated by the postACA trend toward narrow networks, in which insurers engage fewer health
care providers in an effort to control costs. 275
Yet, although an all-subsidy system may avoid the personal and programmatic stigma of dependency and positively impact access, it leaves the
beliefs and dichotomies of the self-reliance myth intact. Though Medicaid
recipients’ stigma would be alleviated, the beneficiaries of other visible benefits programs (namely welfare programs) would still find themselves subject
to self-reliance scrutiny. A subsidy-based unified system might thereby destigmatize government aid for health insurance but not for other kinds of
visible government assistance.
Eliminating Medicaid and replacing it with an all-subsidy private insurance model could have administrative implications. For example, the
current subsidy operates as a tax credit. 276 Individuals can receive their support in one of two ways: either (1) as a direct payment to an insurer on the
marketplace to lower the recipient’s costs or (2) as an adjustment on the
person’s tax return. 277 Recipients can decide how much of their credit they
would like to apply toward their monthly premiums and how much they
would like to receive at tax time. 278 Advocates of tax-based welfare initiatives have also asserted that hidden benefits are more administratively efficient than their more visible counterparts because most people already file
annual tax returns. For example, proponents of the earned income tax credit

274

See generally Huberfeld, supra note 56 (discussing the importance of payment rates in
physicians’ decisions of whether to see Medicaid patients).
275
See generally SABRINA CORLETTE ET AL., GEORGETOWN UNIV. HEALTH POLICY INST . &
URBAN INST ., NARROW PROVIDER NETWORKS IN NEW HEALTH PLANS: BALANCING AFFORDABILITY WITH ACCESS TO QUALITY CARE (2014), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/
issue_briefs/2014/rwjf413643 [https://perma.cc/G66V-EUPU] (discussing the phenomenon of
narrow networks).
276
KAISER FAM ILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: QUESTIONS ABOUT HEALTH
INSURANCE SUBSIDIES 4 (2014), http://files.kff.org/attachment/explaining-health-care-reformquestions-about-health-insurance-subsidies-issue-brief [https://perma.cc/7JQT-3PZK] [hereinafter
EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM ].
277
Id. at 5.
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Id.
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and other programs argue that such programs could reduce the role of complex and costly bureaucracy. 279
In terms of economic benefits, an all-subsidy program may hold potential for more economic flexibility, and perhaps cost savings, than Medicaid.
Although states may vary in terms of the benefits they provide recipients
above the federally required mandatory floor, once enrolled, Medicaid beneficiaries for the most part have free access to their state’s program. 280 In
other words, a person who is at 138% of the FPL and a person at 38% of the
FPL will have access to the same set of benefits at the same cost if they live
in the same place. Conversely, the low-income subsidy provides tax credits
on a sliding scale, according to income level. Unlike Medicaid’s equalizing
uniformity, the low-income subsidy’s structure allows the government to
tailor the level of assistance to each individual’s economic need. This level
of specificity could make the unified subsidy option more economically
efficient because it could reduce the chances that a person might receive more
of a benefit than what is actually required, and only individuals with the
greatest need would get policies that are fully funded by the government. This
flexibility might be politically palatable on both sides of the aisle.
Although tax credits have generally gained popularity as a “pro-work”
alternative to direct assistance, 281 they face certain administrative limits as a
welfare-policy vehicle. To start, not everyone must file a tax return. Specifically, the poor are not typically required to file, unless they are seeking a tax
credit. 282 Thus, one drawback of an all-subsidy system is that those who are
in need of government assistance with health insurance may not regularly
file tax returns. Requiring government assistance to turn on filing a tax return—when the person would not otherwise be obligated to do so and perhaps cannot afford to do so—could therefore inadvertently exclude a signif-

279

Alstott, supra note 271, at 564–65.
Some states have been requiring cost-sharing as part of their § 1115 waivers to expand
Medicaid under the ACA. MARYBETH MUSM ECI & ROBIN RUDOWITZ, KAISER FAM ILY FOUND.,
T HE ACA AND MEDICAID EXPANSION WAIVERS 8–9 (2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issuebrief-the-aca-and-medicaid-expansion-waivers [https://perma.cc/3MS6-PY2P]. And the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 as well as the ACA allowed states to engage in some cost-sharing experiments, especially with the newly eligible population (under the ACA). Paradise, supra note 40, at
5; see also infra note 309 (discussing the Deficit Reduction Act).
281
Alstott, supra note 271, at 539 n.22 (quoting 139 CONG. REC. H5532 (daily ed. July 30,
1993) (statement of Rep. Richardson)) (explaining that advocates of the EITC described the tax
credit as “pro-work because, unlike other forms of assistance to the poor, only those who work
and have earnings can receive benefits”).
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Id. at 585.
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icant portion of government beneficiaries, thereby undermining the goal of
the program. 283
Even assuming that eligible individuals file tax returns, the subsidy
still faces other administrative challenges as a vehicle of government assistance for the poor. One scholar explains that a tax-based welfare program
must inevitably confront the issue of how to measure income, as defining
income for tax purposes and defining income for benefits purposes serve
two different sets of objectives. 284 “Income” in the benefits context is more
rightly understood as a proxy for “economic resources.” 285 Hence, in assessing income, tax-based welfare programs are attempting to assess need.
Taxable income is such a flawed measure of need, though, that another
scholar has opined:
Taxable income as defined for the federal income tax is so poor a
definition of need that to use it as the base for negative income
tax payments would be a travesty of common sense and good justice. Society does not want to pay benefits to people with low
taxable income but with ample resources—wealth, tax-exempt interest, capital gains, pensions, social security stipends, college fellowships, large itemized deductions, gift receipts, and so on. 286
Thus, although a subsidy system could offer a finer calibration of need because it operates on a sliding scale, using taxable income as a baseline could
result in an allocation of benefits that does not correspond to actual resources. 287
In addition, scholars point out that there is a lag between changes in
income and the responsiveness of the tax system. Depending on the given
tax structure and its associated accounting periods, a tax credit may either
favor or harm individuals with fluctuating or with steady incomes. 288 Because incomes fluctuate, the associated benefit will also shift—going back
to the problem of churn, discussed above. The HealthCare.gov website explains that, “If your income changes, or if you add or lose members of your
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Anne Alstott makes a similar observation regarding the EITC. See id. (“Ironically, the
traditional tax policy goal of exempting the poor from income taxation tends to undermine automatic EITC participation.”).
284
Id. at 566–69.
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Id. at 571.
286
Id. at 573 (quoting James Tobin, Raising the Incomes of the Poor, in AGENDA FOR THE
NATION 113 (Kermit Gordon ed., 1968)).
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Id. at 576–79.
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household, your premium tax credit will probably change too.” 289 Specifically, it explains that if an individual actually makes more than originally
anticipated, he or she might have to pay back some—even all—of the premium tax credit received. 290 A person with an unstable income who needs a
subsidy may not be able to afford the cost of the full premium up front. The
website also cautions individuals that they must immediately report any life
changes that could affect their subsidy amount or they could end up owing
money to the government. 291 In 2015, by at least one estimate, two-thirds of
subsidy recipients ended up owing the government some amount of money
at tax time. 292 That said, it is also possible that a Medicaid recipient might end
up owing the government money. If a person’s income increases past the eligibility point while on benefits, the government may require reimbursement
for services received before the change in status officially took effect. On the
other hand, for a program offering a single level of support, eligibility is an
up-or-down determination. A person cannot be partially eligible.
Finally, private insurance is, by most accounts, more expensive, administratively and in terms of the cost of care, than public insurance. 293 Researchers have consistently found that private insurance is more costly than
public insurance. 294 This may in part be due to the fact that we invite the
289

How to Save on Your Monthly Insurance Bill with a Premium Tax Credit, HEALTH
CARE. GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/lower-costs/save-on-monthly-premiums [https://perma.cc/
C9LJ-A3QV] [hereinafter How to Save]; see also Premium Tax Credits, OBAM ACARE FACTS,
http://obamacarefacts.com/insurance-exchange/premium-tax-credits/ [https://perma.cc/9B27-HS5R]
(explaining “[i]f your income changes slightly, then the exact amount of assistance you get will
too”).
290
How to Save, supra note 289; see also Premium Tax Credits, supra note 289 (advising
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advance and to just wait for the benefit until tax time).
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to the Marketplace as soon as possible.”); see also Premium Tax Credits, supra note 289 (stressing
the importance of reporting life changes to the marketplace).
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Private Insurance?, 40 INQUIRY 323, 333 (2003).
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CMS recently issued a report showing that qualified health plans in the exchanges are
more costly than public plans. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CERTIFICATION OF
COM PARABILITY OF PEDIATRIC COVERAGE OFFERED BY QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS 3 (2015),
http://www.medicaid.gov/chip/downloads/certification-of-comparability-of-pediatric-coverageoffered-by-qualified-health-plans.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAU6-8ZB7] (finding that the Children’s
Health Insurance Program, which is tied to Medicaid in many states, offers more comprehensive
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Costs, 27 HEALTH AFF. w318 (2008), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/4/w318.full.pdf+
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middleman of employers into private insurance, and because Medicaid simply pays providers less than private insurance; but it is also due to privateinsurance-specific factors, such as high pay for executives, marketing costs,
concerns about shareholder profits, and administrative costs and waste in
refusing and delaying payment. Thus, pushing all low-income Americans
into private insurance could result in higher health care costs due to an extension of the higher costs of private insurance.
B. Medicaid-Based Unified System
Building on the universality embraced by the ACA, Medicaid could
cover everyone up to 250% of the FPL, with no other qualifying characteristics. Like the all-subsidy approach, this model contains positive and negative implications from a variety of viewpoints, including possible influence
on health care fragmentation, personal and programmatic stigma, access to
care, administrative matters, cost control, and implications for universality.
From a theoretical perspective, an all-Medicaid system would avoid
self-reliance scrutiny and destigmatize recipients of government assistance.
The ACA adopted a principle of universality, 295 a key change for a previously
exclusionary system. 296 This effort is arguably most evident in Medicaid. 297
Because the ACA’s principle of universality rendered Medicaid a social insurance program, rather than a welfare program, this section briefly considers the statutory implications of the ACA as enacted (rather than as judicially interpreted). If the ACA were implemented as enacted, every state would
cover all of the nation’s poor earning up to 138% of the FPL, regardless of
work status, parenting status, or other proxy for self-reliance. As enacted,
the ACA ensured that the poor would not be excluded from health insurance
because they could not afford it, whether or not they are currently working.
As enacted, the ACA rejected states’ path dependence in welfare policies—

and CHIP); Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Honorable Charles B.
Rangel, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways & Means (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/costestimate/hr3962rangel0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R75XHQ3] (analyzing the proposed public health insurance option as administratively cheaper than
private insurance, but not necessarily cheaper than private insurance overall depending on whether
the payment rates compete with private insurance).
295
See generally Roberts & Huberfeld, Empirical, supra note 10 (exploring the principle of
universality in Medicaid); Roberts & Huberfeld, Great Society, supra note 10 (same).
296
See generally Huberfeld, supra note 9 (exploring the principle of universality in Medicaid).
297
See supra notes 37–72 and accompanying text (examining self-reliance scrutiny and stigma against Medicaid recipients under current scheme). See generally Roberts & Huberfeld, Empirical, supra note 10 (exploring the principle of universality in Medicaid); Roberts & Huberfeld,
Great Society, supra note 10 (same).
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policies which have often been punitive in nature and have facilitated exclusion in health care access in many states. As enacted, the ACA strengthened Medicaid’s universality by increasing payments to primary care physicians for 2013–14, which was designed to encourage better physician uptake of the newly eligible population. 298 And, as enacted, the Medicaid population would already be one quarter of the U.S. population at any given moment, further facilitating the ACA’s destigmatizing effects through the principle of universality.
Instead, NFIB continues to thwart low-income Americans intended to be
protected by the principle of universality from being fully de-stigmatized.
Though King would have been disastrous for people relying on tax subsidies if the Court had held for the law’s challengers, NFIB has done more
than frustrate unified implementation of the Medicaid expansion—it has
allowed states to reintroduce self-reliance scrutiny into Medicaid. The Obama
Administration is negotiating with states in a conciliatory fashion to ensure
that expansion and enrollment occur; their current goal is policy entrenchment. As these expansion negotiations continue, NFIB has made it so that
the myth of self-reliance can be reintroduced into health care through enforceable cost-sharing requirements, job training, work search, 299 and related “self-reliance” requirements. 300 HHS rejects such state-imposed selfreliance myths, as they are unrelated to the Medicaid Act’s goal of providing “medical assistance,” but state legislators have been finding ways to
link state-based work search requirements to state-run welfare programs as
side-along requirements for Medicaid expansion. 301
298
Health Care Education and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1202, 124
Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. tits. 20, 26, 42 (2012)).
299
See, e.g., Eric Whitney, Wittich Suspicious of Montana Medicaid Expansion Waiver Application, MONT . PUB. RADIO (Aug. 17, 2015), http://mtpr.org/post/wittich-suspicious-montanamedicaid-expansion-waiver-application [https://perma.cc/9ZVA-UYP4] (discussing Montana’s
waiver application). The article conveys, regarding Montana’s Medicaid expansion waiver negotiations:

Representative Art Wittich, a Belgrade Republican, says the state’s draft waiver application appears to leave out provisions requiring some recipients to work or look
for work to continue receiving benefits if they fail to pay premiums for Medicaid
coverage. “That language was not in this waiver application,” Wittich said, “and I
want to make sure that CMS has that so that there isn’t a misunderstanding down the
road when the state wants to enforce it.”
Id.
300

Though HHS cannot approve work-related requirements, some states are contemplating
state-based work-search requirements that could interfere with other welfare benefits if not fulfilled. See UNINSURED ADULTS, supra note 72, at 2.
301
See Corey Davis, Medicaid Expansion Work Requirements, NAT ’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.healthlaw.org/publications/search-publications/Medicaid-expansion-
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If Medicaid covered everyone up to 250% of the FPL, these non-health
care related requirements would be revealed as ideology rather than meaningful health policy. As discussed above, people falling into the category of
the penultimate poor who qualify for Medicaid but cannot enroll because
they live in non-expansion states are largely workers. 302 And those uninsured before the ACA was enacted were primarily workers. 303 Work requirements would be meaningless for people already working and would be
revealed as political grandstanding if Medicaid eligibility increased to earnings of 250% of the FPL.
Moreover, just by covering low-income families at up to 138% of the
FPL, which in 2015 was about $16,245 per year for a single person, Medicaid is estimated to cover 25% of the U.S. population upon full implementation of Medicaid expansion. 304 A program that commonplace, through pure
numbers, could defeat the stigma traditionally associated with it on both personal and programmatic dimensions—especially if 138% were raised to
250% of the FPL. 305 In fact, some managed-care companies that serve Medicaid beneficiaries are already using marketing language like “treat yourself”
to Medicaid, a signal that universality makes the program more desirable. 306
Additionally, from a personal stigma perspective, Medicaid beneficiaries
would no longer be “other”—the status of using Medicaid for health insurance would be the norm, rather than relegated to maternity wards, nursing
homes, and a limited range of other health care providers. 307 This personal
destigmatization could strengthen programmatic reputation, as Medicaid
work [https://perma.cc/CW9C-7JWW] (explaining why states will be unable to impose such work
requirements).
302
See supra notes 188–269 and accompanying text (examining and dismissing popular notions that those receiving public assistance do not engage in work).
303
See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid and National Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2009, 2010 (2009).
304
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 61, at 58 (“By 2024, about 89 million people will be
enrolled in Medicaid at some time during the year.”). Medicaid already covers 22% of the population. Total Monthly Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment, KAISER FAM ILY FOUND. (2015), http://kff.
org/health-reform/state-indicator/total-monthly-medicaid-and-chip-enrollment
[https://perma.cc/
5W49-8Z58].
305
See generally Heidi Allen et al., The Role of Stigma in Access to Health Care for the Poor,
92 MILBANK Q. 289 (2014) (studying and discussing the role of stigma for low-income patients).
306
For example, Passport Health Plan in Kentucky used this language in newspaper and billboard advertisements to encourage enrollment when Kentucky expanded Medicaid eligibility. See
Advertisement for Passport Health Plan, FLOYD COUNTY T IM ES (Nov. 19, 2014), http://ads.
floydcountytimes.com/prestonburg-ky/communication/newspaper/the-floyd-county-times/201411-19-1383772-treat-yourself-to-a-medicaid-plan-that-cares-if-you-ve-had-trouble-getting-healthcare-coverage-call-passport-we-ll-take-the-time-to-listen-and-understand-your-needs-call-us-at-1800-578-0603-to-make-passport-your-medicaid-plan-we-take-t [https://perma.cc/MA4W-HGXE].
307
See Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 69 (discussing value of expanding Medicaid beyond certain persons and illnesses).
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beneficiaries would be in every part of the health care system, forcing the
program itself to stop behaving like Medicare’s stunted sibling. This universality would underline Medicaid’s new role as social insurance rather than
welfare medicine, which in turn could have a halo effect on other welfarerelated programs and populations.
Beyond the potential to destigmatize, raising the eligibility level to
earnings of 250% of the FPL would be prudent policy for a number of reasons. Current data regarding purchasers of health insurance through state
and federal exchanges indicate that the 250% line would capture most families that receive substantial tax subsidies and assistance with cost-sharing. 308
Moving enrollment from hidden to visible government assistance would
place low-income individuals and families in a public program that has
fewer out-of-pocket expenses. 309
308

In 2015, about 11.7 million people “selected” qualified health plans, and 10.2 million
effectuated that selection by paying premiums for private health insurance on the federal and state
exchanges. March 31, 2015 Effectuated Enrollment Snapshot, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. (2015), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Factsheets-items/2015-06-02.html [https://perma.cc/BU45-KE2C]. Of the 10.2 million who purchased
private insurance, about 85% (8.7 million) qualified for subsidies, and nearly 58% of all enrollees
also qualified received cost-sharing assistance (5.9 million). Id. Cost-sharing assistance is available on a sliding scale to those earning 100–400% of the FPL, but the greatest cost-sharing benefits
go to those earning 100–250% of the FPL due to the ACA’s complex algorithm for cost-sharing
assistance. See ACA § 1402, 124 Stat. at 202. Additionally,
People who are eligible to receive a premium tax credit and have household incomes
from 100% to 250% of poverty are eligible for cost-sharing subsidies. (The costsharing subsidies are available only to the lowest income Marketplace enrollees who
meet all of the other criteria for receiving the premium tax credit). . . . [T]he eligible
individual or family must purchase a silver level plan in order to receive the costsharing subsidy.
EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM , supra note 276, at 5.
309
As enacted in 1965, Medicaid contained no premiums and no co-payments, and studies
have consistently shown that such expenses (premiums and co-payments) prevent Medicaid beneficiaries and other patients from obtaining care. See, e.g., Niteesh K. Choudhry et al., Eliminating
Medication Copayments Reduces Disparities in Cardiovascular Care, 33 HEALTH AFF. 863, 863
(2014) (finding co-payments are a barrier to appropriate care for non-white patients after a cardiovascular event); LEIGHTON KU & VICTORIA WACHINO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
T HE EFFECT OF INCREASED COST -SHARING IN MEDICAID 1–2 (2005), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/5-31-05health2.pdf [https://www.perma.cc/2ATU-S8RW] (asserting that
co-payments and premiums in Medicaid are barriers to enrolling in insurance and to accessing
care). Nevertheless, through waivers and some measures implemented by recent statutory amendments such as the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, as well as the ACA, some cost-sharing occurs in
Medicaid, though historically it is non-enforceable, meaning care cannot be denied for inability to
pay. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-71, 120 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of U.S.C. tits. 7, 12, 16, 20, 28–29, 42, 47); Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Cost
Sharing, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/
cost-sharing/cost-sharing.html [https://perma.cc/ZU5Y-V356]. The premiums and cost-sharing in
private insurance, and thus in the exchanges, are notably higher than what is permitted in Medi-
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Raising the eligibility level could also unite families that have disparate policies, which complicates health care access and cost. The following
situation, for example, is not uncommon for low-income families: the mother
is on Medicaid when she’s pregnant, her spouse is receiving subsidies to
purchase an individual policy on an exchange, and their child is enrolled in
the Children’s Health Insurance Program. Such families experience individual fragmentation within our already highly fragmented health care system. 310 Fragmentation encompasses disconnection along the vectors of both
access to and continuity of care. When each family member has a different
type of insurance with different types of accompanying benefits, accessing
the health care system becomes even more complex and daunting. 311 Unification through raising Medicaid eligibility to 250% of the FPL could combat both individual and systemic fragmentation, improving care and simplifying families’ financial and health care needs. 312
In terms of administrative simplification, Medicaid eligibility up to
250% of FPL could create a floor of federal standards that is less statedeferential than the rules for qualified health plans in the exchanges. Though
states have flexibility in creating benchmark equivalent coverage for the newly eligible Medicaid population under the ACA, the benchmark coverage arguably is more consistent from state to state than the private insurance available on the exchanges. 313 Further, staffing could be streamlined, eliminating
the need for navigators and others who facilitate insurance enrollment
through exchanges. More generous open enrollment and more consistent enrollment and payment policy for Medicaid could simplify not only administration of health insurance generally, but also such common individual life
events as moving to another state for a job or adding a family member.
On the other hand, despite federally uniform standards, Medicaid has
fifty-six different versions; each state, territory, and the District of Columbia
can exercise options available in the Medicaid Act, which complicates the administration of Medicaid as compared to a totally federal program like Medicaid. See Ku & Broaddus, supra note 294, at w322–25 (comparing Medicaid to private insurance
costs and finding that Medicaid has significantly lower out-of-pocket costs and costs less per insured).
310
See generally T HE FRAGM ENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE, supra note 70 (exploring the
fragmented nature of the health care system in the United States).
311
Organizations like Texas-based Community Health Choice attempt to provide an ad hoc
solution for this fragmentation for low-income families by offering plan management across the
various programs. See About Us, CM TY. HEALTH CHOICE, https://www.communitycares.com/enus/About-Us [https://perma.cc/S47E-MT2R].
312
See generally Huberfeld, supra note 9 (discussing the de-fragmenting effect universality
should have on health care generally).
313
See ACA § 2001, 124 Stat. at 271–79 (regarding benchmark coverage for the newly eligible Medicaid population).
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care. This federal-state partnership can encourage experimentation that spurs
improved enrollment or better care, but the argument for “innovation” is
overshadowed by the fact that no clearinghouse exists for processing or analyzing state experimentation and its results. Though the federalism relationships in Medicaid may be confounding, Medicaid’s various state-based incarnations are no more complicated than tax subsidies that are dependent on the
federal tax system combined with state-based models.
In terms of economic implications, Medicaid historically has been inexpensive—by American health care standards—on a per capita basis as
well as in administrative costs. 314 This may seem counterintuitive given the
large share of state budgets that Medicaid occupies (typically the secondlargest budget item, behind education). Medicaid’s relatively low costs stem
from various factors, including a small administrative agency staff relative
to the size of the program, sharing costs with states, and paying participating providers less than private insurance or Medicare. 315 The low payment
of health care providers in Medicaid has been the subject of much litigation,
recently shut down by the Supreme Court. 316 One of the authors has written
elsewhere about the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc. and next steps for ensuring sufficient payment for
Medicaid providers. 317 Fair payment in Medicaid certainly factors into provider willingness to see Medicaid patients, and states have proven that their
need to balance budgets on the back of Medicaid providers makes HHS’s
role in overseeing payment rates crucial. But, although some states have
been slow to pay in times of budget crises, Medicaid generally does not engage in the same slow-pay or no-pay games that private insurers have used.
Further, Medicaid carries neither the executive compensation nor marketing
expenses that private insurers claim are essential to their operations. 318
Unifying insurance coverage through Medicaid for everyone earning
up to 250% FPL could also reduce churn, as people earning less than 250%
of FPL are the most likely to experience income fluctuation and thus discontinuity of insurance coverage. 319 Health policy experts have suggested
314

See Ku & Broaddus, supra note 294, at w323; Rosenbaum, supra note 303, at 2010–11.
See Huberfeld, supra note 56, at 1157 (discussing Medicaid’s low payment rates from an
empirical perspective).
316
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015) (deciding that the
Supremacy Clause does not provide a private right of action for health care providers seeking to
force states to pay sufficient rates in the Medicaid program).
317
See Huberfeld, supra note 56, at 1159–60.
318
See Rosenbaum, supra note 303, at 2011 (noting Medicaid’s lower administrative costs
relative to commercial insurers).
319
See BUETTGENS ET AL., supra note 248, at 4 (finding that churn is most prevalent for those
earning 200% of the FPL or less).
315
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other measures to help reduce churn, such as data collection regarding disenrollment and other enrollment-related information; twelve-month eligibility rather than monthly determinations in Medicaid; use of premium assistance to help Medicaid beneficiaries purchase private insurance in exchanges so they can stay in one plan regardless of the source of payment; and use
of the ACA’s Basic Health Program option. 320 Although these measures are
likely to mitigate churn in the context of the existing statutory structure,
raising Medicaid eligibility could have even greater impact in reducing interruptions in care and coverage that now occur because of churn.
In summary, this Part demonstrates that a unified system of government assistance for the poor has both theoretical and real-world benefits. An
all-subsidy government program for the poor could avoid the dependency
stigma and self-reliance scrutiny frequently attached to visible government
benefits like Medicaid, facilitating greater enrollment and perhaps greater
access to health care providers than Medicaid beneficiaries typically experience. From a cost perspective, a subsidy-based system that operates on a sliding scale also may offer some economic nimbleness, ideally ensuring that
people in need receive the right amount of support from the government
while avoiding waste. Although the low-income subsidy avoids the pitfalls of
self-reliance scrutiny, it does nothing to nullify the underlying beliefs. Consequently, aid recipients might escape negative stereotyping in the health
insurance context but still be subject to dependency stigma in other areas.
Further, tax subsidies are a clunky mechanism for redistributing wealth for
health insurance coverage, and private insurance has been shown to be more
administratively costly than public insurance.
On the other hand, an all-Medicaid program that raises eligibility to
250% of FPL reduces health care fragmentation for both families and the system as a whole. The sheer number of people covered and their ubiquity in the
health care system, in contrast to their current limited visibility, would reduce
personal and programmatic stigmatization. Further, all-Medicaid would likely
simplify administrative matters, and relatedly would likely result in lower
costs of care, as Medicaid is historically a less expensive mechanism for
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See, e.g., SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., T HE COMMONWEALTH FUND, MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF CHURNING UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT : LESSONS FROM MEDICAID 3–4
(2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2014/jun/1754_
rosenbaum_mitigating_effects_churning_aca_rb_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJS2-J9TH]; Sommers
et al., supra note 255, at 705–06; Katherine Swartz et al., Reducing Medicaid Churning: Extending Eligibility for Twelve Months or to End of Calendar Year Is Most Effective, 34 HEALTH AFF.
1180, 1181, 1184 (2015) (analyzing potential impact of four possible churn-reduction proposals);
Key Implementation Issues: Retention and Churn, NAT ’L ACADEM Y FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y,
http://www.nashp.org/retention-and-churn [https://perma.cc/8WJH-GKVX].
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providing medical care. Finally, the principle of universality is better fulfilled,
in all of its dimensions, through this approach.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, government assistance in health insurance takes
two primary forms: visible direct benefits and hidden tax subsidies. When
Congress enacted the ACA, it perpetuated this divided system by creating
bifurcated support for poorer Americans through (1) the low-income subsidy and (2) the expanded Medicaid program. Yet, although the low-income
subsidy survived its legal challenge in June 2015, the Supreme Court effectively gutted the Medicaid expansion in an earlier decision. Likewise, politicians have expressed disdain and reluctance for visible benefits for lowincome Americans, while remaining relatively silent on this issue of hidden
ones.
The disparate treatment of these two substantively similar programs
mirrors the self-reliance versus dependency and private versus public dichotomies that are so entrenched in American mythos. Medicaid recipients
are subject to self-reliance scrutiny, with society labeling them as undesirable dependents. Self-reliance, though, is a myth, both in general and in the
context of health care. This Article reveals that the line between visible and
hidden government assistance is unprincipled and incurs financial and administrative costs. This Article therefore explores dismantling the current
divided system in favor of a unified program designed to provide a more
unified mechanism of health insurance to low-income individuals and families.
The authors hope that this proposal will have meaningful social and
practical impact. By attacking the American myth of self-reliance, this Article demonstrates that society is not divided between lazy dependents and
good citizens, but rather that all Americans could at some point find themselves in need of government assistance. Whereas for its first forty-nine
years, Medicaid only covered roughly 40% of the poor, the program now
touches nearly every American life. 321 Due to the ACA, an estimated 25% of
the population will benefit from Medicaid’s health care coverage. 322 Thus, if
an individual is not on Medicaid, chances are a friend, family member, coworker, or employee is. Likewise, the low-income subsidy is an essential
aspect of health care reform, helping at least ten million individuals pur-
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See Huberfeld & Roberts, Great Society, supra note 10, at 1.
Id.

60

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 57:1

chase coverage to obtain policies on the state exchanges in 2014. 323 The
subsidy redistributes income via health insurance policies funded with tax
credits to individuals in financial need. 324 Revealing that the dividing line
between Medicaid and the low-income subsidies is theoretically unprincipled calls into question the bifurcated government assistance that reflects it.
After all, missing just one day’s work is enough to bounce a person from
visible to hidden government assistance.
Moreover, by arguing for a unified system, we hope to streamline
health insurance for lower-income Americans, making government assistance both simpler and less costly. As people bounce back and forth between Medicaid and subsidized private insurance, it costs both those individuals and the government time and money. A single system, whether
based in Medicaid or on subsidies, would therefore be more efficient.
Given the fraught legal battles surrounding the ACA for the past five
years, Congress may not revisit the issue of providing health insurance to the
poor in the near future. Nevertheless, when it does, lawmakers should consider dismantling the falsely divisive private versus public system of government
assistance in favor of a more inclusive and more efficient unified program.
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